
Evidence has been mounting of the mushrooming of nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran, Iraq earlier, and now Libya since the eighties, with some intelligence reports indicating its continuation even now. Then there were the suspicions of Saudi Arabia8217;s acquisition of long-range nuclear-capable ballistic missiles from China in 1987, and the recent hobnobbing of the Saudi leadership with nuclear establishment in Pakistan. The nuclear proliferation road to each and all these countries seems to originate in Islamabad/ Kahuta. Muammar Gaddafi8217;s son, who negotiated Libya8217;s renunciation of its clandestine nuclear weapons programme, has left the world in no doubt that Libya acquired its bomb technology and material from Pakistan.
Given its role in promoting jihadi terrorism and nuclear proliferation, it may be easy to conclude that nothing better could be expected from Pakistan. But the rationale for Pakistan to indulge in such proliferation goes beyond mere financial benefit or religion-driven motivations, although they certainly played a role. Two questions would need to be addressed for the future. First, what should, or can be, done about Pakistan? There are sufficient indications that the US and the international community would not be willing or able to apply any pressure for it to change its grand strategy in any meaningful way. Second, how should the world address the larger question of non-proliferation dangers?