The in-house Army report on the Kargil conflict has resuscitated the controversy on the timing of the Indian Air Force’s entry into the battle zone in 1999, stoking the apparent rivalry between the two forces.The report was ordered by then Army Chief Gen V.P. Malik to study the shortcomings of the armed forces during the conflict. The report was prepared by the Army Training Command and the Directorate-General Military Operations, using classified information given to the Kargil Review Committee as well as action taken reports of the formations active during the conflict.The Army Training Command was till recently headed by Lt Gen J.J. Singh, who was additional DGMO during Kargil, and the present chief Gen N.C. Vij was the DGMO during the war.While Malik and then Air Chief A.Y. Tipnis refuse to comment on the issue, former Western Air Commander Vinod Patney says: ‘‘It would not have made the slightest difference to the number of casualties even if the air strikes had been ordered earlier. The number of casualties were more because of tactical choices made by the Army.’’ The conflict snuffed out 526 lives and maimed at least 1,000 soldiers.Patney terms the report a ‘‘nasty piece of work’’ and an attempt by the Army to ‘‘cozy up to the new government’’.The K. Subrahmanyam Committee report had also hinted at the differences between the Army and the Air Force on use of air power in the conflict. The report says, ‘‘The Committee found that though the Corps Commander (Lt Gen Krishan Pal) had moved adequate forces to contain the intrusion in the Batalik sector . there was still no clarity in the assessment of the magnitude of the intrusions and the composition of the intruders. This is evident from the statement of the Corps Commander on May 19.’’It was only on May 21, after Gen Malik returned from Poland, that it was felt some action was required. The Cabinet had asked if the situation was serious enough to warrant the use of air power. According to the report, the then PM and Defence minister were briefed about the situation on May 24. The CCS cleared the use of air power the day after.However, according to the Kargil Review Committee report, Tipnis had offered a word of caution.‘‘The Air Chief further maintained that if air power was to be used, the country should be prepared for a Pakistani response. Therefore, the relevant air commands and units were activated,’’ it states.Those involved in the Kargil operations are clear that while the Army wanted the Air Force to enter the battle zone even before the extent of intrusion was known, the latter made the government aware that the introduction of fighters into the theatre would bring the war into a different plane. Essentially, the Air Force was sounding the government about the possibility of an all-out war with Pakistan.Army generals say the air action was confined to destroying the enemy supply line and not soldiers, who were safely ensconced in ‘‘sangers’’ on hilltops. The air action was successful only after Mirages were inducted and laser-guided ammunition was used to target supply lines in Muntho Dalo in Batalik sector and help the Army take over Tiger Hill in July.
