It146;s a long road to disarmament

To coincide with the 20th anniversary of the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi8217;s speech at the UN General Assembly on the subject...

To coincide with the 20th anniversary of the late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi8217;s speech at the UN General Assembly on the subject, the government is scheduled to host an international conference titled 8216;Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons8217; next week. Of late there has been a renewed interest in nuclear disarmament, following two articles, the first one in early 2007 and the second one in early 2008, on the same subject, by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn in the Wall Street Journal. Since then there have a number of conferences and the issue is a hot topic for conferences.

The reasons for this renewed interest are not far to seek. The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, done in early 2005 by Senator Lugar with responses from nearly a hundred internationally known non-proliferation and national security experts threw up some alarming forecasts. According to the experts surveyed, both the median and average number of new countries that would acquire nuclear weapons would be four. Presumably since this survey was done in 2005, the respondents had already factored in the non-NPT nuclear weapon states 8212; India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. That would raise the number of nuclear weapon states in the future to 13. The possibility of a WMD attack against a target somewhere in the world, they said, is increasing.

Two other factors make this issue very relevant today. The first is the anticipated renaissance in the coming year of the nuclear power industry as the prices of hydrocarbon fuels increase in a dramatic fashion with the added concerns about carbon emissions control. At the moment only 26 of the 195 member states of the NPT have any nuclear power generating capacity. This number is expected to grow sharply.

The second factor is the rising profile of rogue non-state actors on the international scene and the entry of commercial enterprises engaging in nuclear proliferation activities, a la the A.Q. Khan network.

One of the principal reasons why past efforts aimed at developing a plan of action for global nuclear disarmament, including Rajiv Gandhi8217;s action plan, had failed in their efforts was their singular focus on disarmament 8212; Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT 8212; with the complete neglect of the proliferation issues, rather than understanding the linkage between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. These two, disarmament and non-proliferation, are two sides of the same coin and progress on one, especially the former, is strongly dependent on progress on the latter.

It is very likely that one or more of the Nuclear Weapon States NWS would not agree to any time-bound disarmament schedule unless preceded by a strong and enforceable non-proliferation regime.

At present the only international agency tasked with any plan of controlling nuclear proliferation is the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA which administers the safeguards agreements it has with the large number of states, both members and non-members of NPT, to verify that none of these states divert any nuclear material that is being safeguarded by the IAEA for explosive purposes. The agency8217;s inspection plans are made with the specific aim of achieving a 95 per cent probability of detecting diversion of 0.3 SQ Standard Quantity of nuclear material.

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Detection and verification of undeclared nuclear material, activities and facilities, however, presents a far greater challenge. While there is reasonable confidence about detecting large-scale nuclear activities and facilities 8212; such as reprocessing plants 8212; detection of undeclared materials and activities on a small scale 8212; such as centrifuge plants sufficient enough to produce one or two SQ Significant Quantity 8212; still remains a challenge.

Any programme of action for disarmament and non-proliferation must be carried out in a transparent manner in a forum accepted by both the NWS and NNWS as being representative of all states with the aim of crafting an agreement that is non-discriminatory unlike the NPT.

As a start to induce confidence amongst the NNWS Non Nuclear Weapon States about the sincerity of their commitment to disarmament, the NWS 8212; both NPT and non-NPT states 8212; must, with the current level of international non-proliferation efforts, one, bring into force the CTBT; two, pending a FMCT, agree to a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapon purposes; three, modify their nuclear doctrines to reduce the importance of these weapons; four, agree to a No First Use Doctrine NFU; five, declare effective unconditional security guarantees to the NNWS on the use of nuclear weapons Negative Security Assurance. Six, the two major nuclear weapon states, the US and Russia, must start preparing for negotiations on SORT-2 to further reduce their strategic nuclear arsenal.

For their part, the NNWS must agree to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by making additional protocol AP mandatory in addition to the CSA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. At present, adherence to AP is voluntary. The IAEA relies on the AP to make the determination about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities in a state. At present the IAEA has no independent power or authority to take action against suspected violators.

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Recent history has shown that the international system neither spoke out clearly against violations nor made efforts to move resolutely against violators. We must toughen the conditions under which a state can withdraw from its safeguards commitments. We must accept that additional measures may be needed to control nuclear proliferation.

The writer is visiting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation

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