How India can help post-war Iraq

The efforts made by the Indian political department to give Iraq a modern civil administration will certainly rank among the great post-war reconstruction stories, along with the establishment of the allied government in post-war Germany and the American-led Japanese Government in devastated Tokyo. At the peak of the Indian administration in Iraq, there were 62 officers in the Accounts, Audit and Finance departments, 30 in Agriculture, including cattle-breeding and poultry, 24 in Customs, 34 in Education, 102 in Irrigation and Canals, 117 in the Justice department, including 63 Qaidis, 84 in the para-military, the Levies, Gendarmerie and Jails administration, 128 in the Health and Hospital services, 39 senior nurses, 49 police officers of the rank of ACP and above and (not surprisingly) 440 British civil servants and 460 Indian subordinate senior staff. The list goes on to include 25 officers in the Port administration, 60 in the Iraq P&T, 32 in the PWD, 82 to run the Iraqi railways, 8 Newspaper Editors, 10 to establish Iraq’s survey department and 6 Veterinarians. Try and match that America!

But more importantly, somewhere in the dusty files of the archives in Delhi lives the institutional memory of this gigantic effort at state-making. When Saddam leaves, can Iraq become a democracy? Let Wilson speak. ‘‘The town wanted the tribes brought under control, the tribesmen wanted title deeds for their land, merchants wanted law courts and laws, municipalities wanted powers and money from central revenues and hospitals, land owners and cultivators clamoured for canals, roads, railways and tested seed,’’ he said in his June 1919 speech in Baghdad.

What should Indian policy be with regard to post-war Iraq? Many fear that Iraq may become another Afghanistan, but this comparison is ridiculous. Civil society in Afghanistan has not even reached the kind of feudalism prevalent in neighbouring Pakistan. Afghans live in a largely tribal society. In the natural process of evolution, Afghan society might well take a hundred years to transit through feudalism to a modern policy with the ability to form governments. Iraq on the other hand is a relatively sophisticated society, depressed into tribalism and tribal loyalties by the needs of Saddam to rule a sullen population. The social indicators of Iraqi society are in many cases superior to those of North India. Female literacy and the percentage of girls attending schools in Iraq are higher than UP and Bihar. So it seems unlikely that attempts to form democratic governments in Iraq will result in a Parliament any worse than those run by Mayawati or Laloo Yadav.

India’s strategic response to the termination of the war in Afghanistan was quite pro-active, sagacious and far-sighted. Driven by knowledgeable retired diplomats who had been posted in Kabul, India reacted on a wide front. Although Karzai was handicapped by Pakistani objections to an Indian role in Kabul, he did opt for Indian assistance in setting up a number of state-making institutions on the Indian model.

This should encourage India to offer a broad package for the reconstruction of post-war Iraq, which may not be entirely motivated by altruism. Iraq is a multi-ethnic society, as well as being multi-denominational with the Sunni elite having ruled the Shia majority all these years owing to their earlier alliance with the Ottoman empire. But Indian claims will have to be initially addressed to the US post-war administration. To convince the Americans that India has a role, this Indian ‘‘package’’ must be put together swiftly and presented to the Americans. Quite obviously the co-ordination will require something more than the MEA.

The advantages of a closer relationship with a post-war Iraq are only too obvious. It is the most populous and secular Arab state in the region. The Indo-Iraq relationship is an old civilisational one which all Indian governments have recognised to be of continuing relevance. Unfortunately, our earlier attempt to train the Iraqi military (a programme that ran for eight years) was used by Saddam only to destabilise his neighbours. Our second attempt to assist Iraq could well begin with consultancy by two of India’s finest democratic institutions — the Census of India and the Central Election Commission — both of which had no role in Iraq in 1919.

The Americans are knowledgeable and sophisticated enough to understand the American federal system of governance is not viable in a multi-ethnic Iraqi society. Generating modern political forces in Iraq will have to begin with a census and an election code, and we have some genuine strengths in creating both. While Iraq could do without an Indian bureaucracy functioning the way it does in India, elements of the Irrigation and Canals, Post & Telegraphs, paramilitary forces, agricultural universities, the Union Public Service Commission, the CAG and Supreme and High Courts are institutions that could contribute to post-war Iraqi society. It might of course be useful to start ‘‘at the beginning’’. The first Iraqi Constitution was written between Delhi and Whitehall in 1921 and a second attempt could be the start we are looking for.

(The writer is a retired Rear Admiral)