Hidden strings and free lunches

Ever since the US state department unveiled its new strategy for South Asia, of US helping India to become a world power in the 21st century...

Ever since the US state department unveiled its new strategy for South Asia, of US helping India to become a world power in the 21st century, there is debate in this country about the costs of this trajectory. Many observers ask whether there are any hidden strings in this offer. There should be an objective assessment of US motives and a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of this offer. Talking vaguely about hidden costs should not become an easy alibi for drift.

The US does not hide its strategy. In a briefing on March 25, the US administration indicated that the world8217;s largest democracy, situated next to China, next to Pakistan-Afghanistan, West Asia and Central Asia, is needed as a stabiliser in this region. Condoleezza Rice, in her address at Sophia University in Tokyo, talked of US-India, US-Japan and US-South Korea friendships serving to engage China and steer it towards integration into the international system. Unlike the Soviet Union, which the US dealt with through containment, China is to be dealt with through the strategy of engagement. The US sees China as a revisionist power as it does not accept values of democracy. The cold war was won without a shot being fired. A strategy of engagement has less probability of force being invoked than even the strategy of containment.

Today8217;s world has six power centres 8212; the US, China, European Union, Japan, Russia and India. Barring Japan the rest are all nuclear and missile powers. Japan has a military alliance with the US and is also in a position to transform itself into a nuclear and missile power at short notice. Except in respect of military action against developing nations 8212; where the US is in a position to act on its own ignoring other balancers 8212; there is already a polycentric balance in the world, especially in respect of trade. Europe is able to impose sanctions on the US. There is an overall understanding that there would be no wars among the nuclear armed major powers. Therefore when the issue is raised about the cost to India of the US strategy of helping it to build itself as a major power, that calculation cannot be on the basis of our experience with a bipolar world but on an assessment of a polycentric balance of power system.

Germany, Japan and China, which were built up by US in its own interest, were former adversaries with whom the US had fought wars. Yet when the US built them up they did not have any reservations in accepting US help. Now Germany and China often follow policies not in consonance with those of the US. Is the US in a position to impose penalties on them? All the US could do when it got angry with France, a beneficiary of the Marshall plan, was to boycott French wines and refer to 8220;French fries8221; as 8220;freedom fries8221;. A polycentric balance of power system will give India far more flexibility and room for manoeuvre than the bipolar system did.

Whether in dealing with another power we run the risk of being let down does not depend upon the intrinsic nature of power but on prevailing circumstances. The US, Russia and France have all gone back on their word in respect of Tarapur fuel at various points of time. Russia reneged on cryogenic engines under US pressure. The ability to manage under similar circumstances depends upon India8217;s resilience and so far it has not been found wanting.

Unlike other countries which have been used to the game of balance of power, Indian diplomacy has only known bipolar world and nonalignment as policy. The talk of hidden costs in dealing with the new US strategy arises out of unfamiliarity with classical balance of power diplomacy, our own past weaknesses and the fear of having to deal with the foremost power which has hurt our interests in the past.

India is not as weak today as it was in the past. The fear of dealing with the US is rooted in our inability to assess the global situation which has led to this change in US strategy and the leverage India has today. This fear is the high cost this country is incurring for its failure to cultivate sophisticated assessment capabilities. There is a lack of understanding of the evolving situation in an increasingly globalising world in which the major powers are unable and therefore unlikely to go to war with each other. As India matures as a major market, as it sustains its democracy and remains free of Islamic fundamentalism, as it is able to contribute to knowledge based technologies and keeps adding to the Indian population in the US whose value is recognised, the country will represent a high stake in the balance of power game.

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It is expected that by the middle of this century, the US and China will be the first two powers of the world, and India the third. The inter se ranking between US and China will to a great extent depend on India and how it plays the game. That is why both the US and China are placing high stakes on this country. In terms of civilisational inheritance, multi-culturalism and democracy, the US and EU have a lot to share. In terms of democracy, multi-culturalism, English language and highly skilled populations, the US and India will have a lot to share. Therefore while all six power centres are likely to balance each other there will be differences in the relative strength of relationships among pairs of powers without destabilising the overall balance.

If India were to choose among the other five, in spite of past history, it would in all likelihood favour US. When the choice comes to whether the US or China should be the pre-eminent power in the world system, it is obvious where India as the third power will put its weight. Therefore the costs in this game will depend on our assessment skills, diplomatic prowess, national productivity and ability to expand knowledge.