Why do you keep calling them when they talk down to you, my friend James Manor asked me, when I told him I would be busy at a meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF). ‘‘I couldn’t take their condescending behaviour with an Indian prime minister’’, he said, referring to the demeanour of the leading lights of the Davos-based Forum. Manor, a political scientist at the University of Sussex who has specialised on India, had a short-lived stint as a consultant to WEF till he walked out on them after his profound embarrassment with the way in which WEF officials talked down to the then prime minister, I.K. Gujral, during an interaction.
India’s attitude to the WEF, to both its Davos jamboree and its India Summit, now underway in New Delhi, has been somewhat paradoxical, compared to China’s. While India gets constantly admonished for not doing enough, and China scores all the brownie points for being the global CEO’s dream destination, Indians continue to sit back and take it, desperately devouring snow-bound Davos in mid-winter, while China is busy promoting its own rival to WEF, in a more hospitable locale.
An interesting contrast is emerging between the way we deal with the world, with globalisation, with various international forums and the way China deals with them. Some of this contrasting behaviour is rooted in cultural attitudes. A certain schizophrenia marks the interaction of the present generation of Indians with foreigners. Most of us come across as either excessively polite and submissive or excessively shirty, arrogant and sanctimonious. Both attitudes betray a lack of self-confidence.
The present generation of Chinese, on the other hand, appears more self-confident in dealing with the world. Appearances can be deceptive, but attitudes show. If Indians sulk about the Davos pontificators but ‘grin ’n’ bear it’, the Chinese smile their way through such interactions, quietly putting together alternative forums.
China has shown a remarkable penchant for getting clubby, getting into as many global groups as possible, sometimes on onerous terms of membership, even as it has simultaneously and successfully tried creating its own groups. With the singular exception of the G-8, where economically smaller Russia has made it while China has not yet, China is a member of most major multilateral and regional forums, some of which we want to eagerly join.
What has defined China’s role in each of these groups, be it APEC or ASEAN+3 or even organisations like the WTO, is its increasing economic engagement with the world.
India too will be more warmly welcomed at each of these forums the day its economic engagement with the world is large enough. It is not our nuclear capability but our economic size and the extent of our economic engagement with the world which will shape the way other countries think of us and how warmly they seek our membership of their forums.
Leaders of China, India, Korea and Japan were present at the ASEAN summit in Cambodia last month. Yet the global and regional media took more note of the now routine ASEAN+3 meetings (with China, Korea and Japan) than the first-ever ASEAN+1 summit with Vajpayee. What defined this difference was the extent of ASEAN’s business engagement with each of the four countries.
What is true of ASEAN will eventually be true of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation. That is, economics and business will determine its relevance. At present SAARC is more a political forum than an economic one, mainly because it is a trade union of India’s smaller neighbours. If it remains a purely political grouping SAARC will die a natural death with each SAARC member realising that their political business with India is largely bilateral and better settled that way, with precious little a regional group can do. In some ways ASEAN has realised this about itself too. Which is why ASEAN was quick to create an economic agenda for itself.
SAARC’s future depends on its ability to create such an economic agenda. In the past India was the laggard on this count since its economy was not open enough to afford business opportunities to its neighbours. While large economies like the United States, Germany, Russia and China find themselves doing considerable business with their immediate and smaller neighbours, India’s Partition and the post-Independence inward-orientation meant that its level of economic engagement with its neighbours was limited.
That is changing today. India has been pursuing increased economic engagement with its neighbours, as indeed with the rest of the world. In SAARC, Pakistan is the hurdle. India’s attempts to skirt the problem by looking at alternative economic groups, like a Bay of Bengal community, an Indian Ocean rim association and so on have borne limited fruit mainly because of India’s still limited economic engagement with the region.
Moreover, a trade agenda alone is unlikely to provide the required economic base for greater regional cooperation. This explains why India is looking at infrastructure and energy as an arena for regional cooperation. There is great promise in this, with even Russia and China showing interest in a regional energy security strategy.
The basic requirement is increased investment. India’s relatively low investment to national income ratio is not enough for us to be able to exploit the opportunities in regional economic cooperation. However, as the rate of investment is stepped up, there will be such opportunities and more countries in the region will be enthused to do more business with us.
It is such business that will bring invitations to new groups. It is not just groups like G-20 and ASEAN-plus-n that India is destined to be a member of. Sooner rather than later no international forum would have any relevance unless both India and China are represented on it. A G-8 with Canada and Italy and no China or India? Pooh! And then, no one from the Alps will dare look down at the Himalayas and the plains on either side.
Write to sanjayabaru@expressindia.com