Good morning Iran, China

Iran’s position was just the opposite. Suspicions of its covert nuclear weapons programme drew closer to confirmation. For a country that was a signatory to the NPT, the rise of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and his unabashed show of nuclear nationalism couldn’t have rung alarm bells louder. Iran soon became the biggest challenge to the well-woven global technology regime — a rebel that needed disciplining. Links with the infamous A.Q. Khan network made Tehran the target of another powerful international discourse — global terrorism. How did Iran react? By 2005, it had set into motion a carefully thought-out diplomatic strategy guided by its key national interest to preserve its nuclear programme.

China was operating in a different orbit. It faced no such questions of legitimacy on preserving a nuclear programme. Its challenges lay in its aspirations. China had to cement its place in the global pecking order, which coincides with the nuclear pecking order. In the dock for its “non-transparent, non-democratic system of governance”, China won a major battle when it got its 123 agreement cleared after more than a decade’s wait during Bill Clinton’s second term, but the Bush regime was inclined to reduce inter-dependence on Beijing. It did not take long for China to figure out that its aim to become an alternate superpower lay in the sphere of non-proliferation. And its sustenance would depend on shedding, as quickly as possible, the tag of the “principal polluter” responsible for climate change. Both objectives converged on the nuclear doorstep. By 2005, China had set into motion an ambitious domestic nuclear expansion programme and was giving shape to agreements with countries like Australia to seal up uranium supplies. And, of course, it had to react to talk of the Indo-US nuclear deal, an unhappy, yet uncalculated irritant.

Three years down the line, look where each stands.

Iran played a high-risk game. It stepped up anti-Western rhetoric and made concessions just when it appeared military action was imminent. It dabbled with big powers, judging their constraints well enough to create a series of small opportunities and buy valuable time. Iran’s principal objective was to bring the US to the negotiating table and, as far as possible, on acceptable terms. Crucial to this was to ensure that Washington remains tied down by its commitments in Iraq. Equally crucial was to play up the insecurity in the Gulf over Israel, and here is where its patronage to the Hezbollah came handy. This paid off. Yes, Iran faced sanctions and is definitely not out of the woods yet but is now better placed with the West, working out package after package of incentives to end the crisis.

China, for its part, used the international focus on nuclear non-proliferation to draw closer, strangely, to Washington. China went in favour of all the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran. It successfully managed to project itself as the voice of correction without, in any manner, blocking economic sanctions. It played the bridge with the West through the six-party talks and brought North Korea to the negotiating table. And all this while, it aggressively stitched up civilian nuclear agreements with Australia and now, Russia. Today, China fashions itself as a key arbitrator in nuclear disarmament and potentially the biggest consumer of the re-emerging nuclear energy industry; and, effectively, emerging as the centrepiece of the international nuclear discourse.

India? It let time and opportunity slip away. It failed to do the political hardsell that this deal was not only about energy and strategic parity but that it was also a nation’s instrument of power, nurtured over half a century by successive governments. The opportunity was created by some crafty diplomacy in the past decade and taken forward through some clever negotiations to realise the nuclear deal. In these three years, the government of India allowed all this to be hijacked by political interests.

In 2008, India still stands at the crossroads while Iran has the luxury of harbouring hope as elections draw closer in the US, and China lives in hope as it watches its plans deliver results. Who is to blame? The Left, because it wasn’t willing to look at the facts without its anti-US ideological prism? Maybe. But it’s clear the Left acted in its political interest, using the nuclear deal as a gel for mobilising its cadres. The BJP too acted in its political interest, daring to snatch away the nationalist plank from the Congress in the name of nuclear testing. What was the Congress’s political interest? To buy a few months in power.

Political parties are not entrusted with an obligation to safeguard the national interest. That’s the strict preserve of the prime minister and the Cabinet Committee on Security. As India heads into an election year with unfulfilled actions in what admittedly constitutes national interest, the buck has to stop with the prime minister. The fact that India finds itself in a less favourable situation than China or Iran despite enjoying a clear head start, the fact that the Indian nuclear programme is starved of fuel with reactors running at half their capacity, are questions for the government to answer, not the Left or the BJP. That’s why it’s critical to put an end to that uncertainty over the deal, either way this month. At least, that would allow fresh stocktaking — by whoever takes charge of the national interest next.

pranab.samantaexpressindia.com