Fuzzy logic as deterrence

Translated into comprehensible English, it indicates that the concept is flexible. Our deterrent is then pegged at the barest minimum level that manages toimpart credibility as well. We will get to know the physical attributes of this so-called deterrent when the National Security Council is done with its deliberations. Meanwhile the dialogue is to proceed apace with 8220;credible interlocuters8221;. It is in this specific context that flexibility assumes a special significance.

But Jaswant Singh is on record as having declared, quite emphatically, to the Far Eastern Economic Review in July that India8217;s deterrence is not on the negotiating table. That assertion was dispelled categorically on December 17, after Prime Minister Vajpayee8217;s statement in Parliament. A 8220;senior8221; Clinton Adminis-tration official, who specialises in South Asian affairs, said India had not yet defined its credible minimum deterrent 8220;requirement8221; and 8220;we will want to discuss that CMD with India8221;.

This is consistent with US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott8217;s injunctions on November 12 wherein he said the 8220;essence of the case that we are making in our current dialogues withboth countries is that there are ways of enhancing security without deploying missiles. Both prime ministers have said they seek to define security requirements at the lowest possible levels8221;. This tells us clearly what is on the negotiating table and what is not. This is the perspective through which to view the prime minister8217;s and the foreign minister8217;s pleadings to credible interlocuters to 8220;improve the atmosphere8221;. The process of 8220;accommodation8221; will then involve consensual definition of the CMD in a manner that will allow for domestic hardsell and yet will not jeopardise long-term US non-proliferation goals in the region.

In order to understand the pattern of negotiations and the flexibility factor inherent therein, it is worthwhile making a comparison of the latest set of policy pronouncements with expectations voiced in similar statements made earlier. The May 11 statement showed the government at its euphoric best: 8220;India would be prepared to consider being an adherent of some of theundertakings in the CTBT. But this cannot be obviously done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.8221; This is as vague and undefined a statement as any. Does the CTBT allow for partial adherence? Why special emphasis on the CTBT? What is the vacuum being talked about? What is the quantity of the reciprocal activities and their individual nature?

On September 14, the prime minister said, 8220;Other nuclear weapons states should establish the clear link between CTBT and genuine disarmament. We are not asking for any recognition from any country.8221; The very next day he said India was insisting on some more changes, particularly with regard to transfer of technology before it considers signing the CTBT. At a press conference he made it clear that India was not prepared to sign the CTBT in its present form. Significantly, he added, 8220;I know the treaty is not going to be amended. But certain other arrangementssh-ould be made which will facilitate our work.8221; It can be successfully argued that transfer of technology was one reciprocal activity our policymakers looked forward to.

Exactly a week later on September 23, he again acknowledged that the basic structure of the CTBT cannot be altered now. Yet, to a question whether Pa-rliament would be taken into confidence before India joined the CTBT, he said Parliament had already discussed the issue during the August debate on foreign policy. It is important to note the subtext here. By this time Talbott had met Singh as many as four times. It is in this precise context that the foreign minister made a questionable assertion on December 24 that there was a much better understanding among the MPs of the difference between 1996, when India refused to sign the CTBT, and the post-Pokharan II period. At the same time a spurious tactical distinction is now being made between signature, ratification and deposition of the ratification. The implication: there is no harm insigning it. India8217;s signature to the CTBT is then clearly linked to the making of the deterrence posture. It is a strategic pre-fix. Signature first, deterrence later. This explains the American insistence of India8217;s signature and the government8217;s hurried intent to submit the same on cue. If the CTBT is introduced to the Senate before India8217;s signature is obtained, it will be dead on arrival.

On October 28, the prime minister picked up the curious refrain from September, telling IFS probationers India would like to be treated on par with other nuclear weapons states. Was that another hint of a reciprocal activity or an outright yearning? By December 16, during his first speech to Parliament as foreign minister, Singh had successfully delinked access to technology from India8217;s signature as different from accession to the CTBT. He said: 8220;When it comes to strategic technology, we are realistic enough to understand, leave alone the US, no country will share its strategic technology willingly. When it comes tonon-strategic technologies, what will certainly be available to India is obsolete technology.8221;

This clear and steady dilution of stated intent with regard to the May 11 statement provides the necessary prism through which to view this curious CMD and the gamut of the strategic dialogue. By seeking a recognition of an already demonstrated capacity a de facto nuclear deterrent seems to be the government8217;s objective. In this world of limited nuclear existentialism, this is likely to be more psychological than real. What real value on the ground does a negotiated deterrence have? A negotiated CMD is less than credible, less than minimal and hardly a deterrent.

The author is director, Research Group, New Delhi