
There are four extremely important lessons for India from a 5-km stretch of macadam in South Delhi. This stretch, as a 2-minute perusal of Delhi8217;s newspapers will inform anyone, is the bus rapid transit BRT corridor. Contrary to the more passionate sections of the uniformly and understandably hostile local reportage, BRTs are not by definition a strange, perverse transport solution.
The idea 8212; dedicated corridors that host punctual, passenger-friendly bus services 8212; has not just been tried in Bogota, as critics snigger, but also in other Latin American cities as well as metropolises in East and Southeast Asia. In India, BRT is on the transport plan of other cities. Plus, I, you, everyone else and their uncle are in favour of better public transport. So let8217;s not say silly things like Delhi8217;s BRT was dreamed up by nasty aliens in IIT Delhi. Then why does it feel as if it was? Therein lie the four lessons.
Lesson 1, political: When undertaking a major urban reform, don8217;t confuse support for your idea with trashing another idea. If you do that you set yourself up for that much more public flak 8212; deservedly. Dinesh Mohan and others associated with the BRT project have for months critiqued metro rail as an expensive non-solution. A recent example is an article by Mohan in the January 26-February 1 issue of The Economic and Political Weekly 8220;Mythologies, Metro Rail Systems and Future Urban Transport8221;.
I am no transport policy boffin, far from it. So when I say that having read some pro and anti-metro arguments I have not become a convert to Mohan8217;s thesis I could well be betraying my lack of understanding. So let8217;s assume Mohan and others are intellectually right. They are still politically wrong. There was no need to aggressively trash a functioning transport system that came up at the cost of relatively little urban dislocation, before the new idea had proved itself. If you do that you look like slightly nutty ideologues, not sensible, practical reformers. That8217;s why smart politicians are better economic reformers than smart economists. The latter don8217;t understand the politics of change. BRT8217;s technocrat backers don8217;t either and they don8217;t have an excuse. They were put in charge.
Lesson 2, political economic: Understand how India is changing. BRT8217;s backers argue that ever-expanding private car and two-wheeler use is unsustainable in urban spaces in India. You don8217;t have to be an expert to know that if more people commute by public transport a lot of universal benefits accrue. But an India-specific feature needs to be considered.
India is at a stage of economic evolution where buying a car or a two-wheeler is a symbol and substance of the economy8217;s transformational capacity. Owning a set of wheels is not mainly a matter of egomaniacal consumerism or irresponsible social behaviour by the rich. It is an exhilarating demonstration to the aam aadmi that his choices are no longer horribly circumscribed by the system. Vehicle ownership in India is in fact still poor by global standards. That figure will and should noticeably improve when one-lakh-rupee cars and what they engender 8212; even cheaper two-wheelers 8212; are available in the market. Before we say this creates a problem we need to say this calls for a celebration. If we don8217;t appreciate this dimension of the question, we are likely to get the answer wrong. As Delhi8217;s BRT has.
The pilot project bus corridor has been carved out of existing roads that already hosted heavy traffic, including private vehicles. What8217;s the message? We will increase the suffering quotient of driving cars and two-wheelers by so much that buses will seem the best option? If that wasn8217;t intended, even more serious questions come up. How could BRT8217;s planners think any other outcome was possible? Trying to make private car/two-wheeler unattractive is a frighteningly unworkable option, given India8217;s political economy. The masses want to drive. So reducing road space for private vehicle traffic is ultimately elitist. Public transport solutions have to keep this in mind.
Lesson 3, economic: Scarce commodities have to be priced properly. The strangest sight in Delhi8217;s BRT pilot project is bumper-to-bumper traffic in the non-bus lane and, by urban standards, vast empty space between two buses in the bus lane. It is a stretch of road that8217;s not being used by anyone even during the rush hour. Delhi8217;s BRT is putting a very low price on those empty stretches in the bus corridor. Now, the most uncontroversial statement about urban transport is that road space is a scarce commodity. And any solution that seemingly assumes that a scarce commodity can be priced low has a fundamental problem. Unless BRT offers extremely frequent bus services 8212; every 10-15 seconds or so 8212; there will be this crippling underpricing problem. But are services that frequent economically viable? Has the economics been worked out?
Lesson 4, common sense: Don8217;t bet people will necessarily remember basic good points of the theory if they viscerally hate the first demonstrations of practice. In the noise of democracy, public disaffection over some issue can reach such a critical decibel level that politicians just go off the idea and most things associated with it. Delhi8217;s BRT may become a classic demonstration of this. The idea of first-rate buses and lane-bound traffic is worth exploring. But the backers of that idea in Delhi are coming across as preachy-propagandist types who, when not partial to dodgy economics, are indifferent to engineered chaos.
Transport experts elsewhere in India please note.
saubhik.chakrabartiexpressindia.com