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Journalism of Courage
Continuing acts of terrorism over the past two decades, first in Punjab and since 1988 in Jammu and Kashmir, require some reflections on how we are dealing with this menace. It would appear that we have dealt with the phenomenon in terms of short-term contingencies and crisis management rather than as a long-term challenge. The latter approach would mean situating immediate and short-term measures in the context of a longer-term perspective, especially where socio-political factors provide the impetus to violence of various types, including that promoted from across the borders. An objective analysis of Pakistan8217;s ideology and its propensity for sub-conventional covert war since 1947, to be backed by regular military, its internal dynamics of power along with pervasive deeper factors like the challenge of rising expectations particularly affecting the youth would clearly indicate that what we are dealing with is a challenge that is likely to persist for another decade or two at least. Nothing would please me more than to be proved wrong.
It is no doubt in recognition of this reality that, based on the reports of the task forces on different aspects of national security issues, the Group of Ministers had recommended more than two and a half years ago that a Policy Planning Division within the Ministry of Home be established. In fact, the high-powered task force to draw up the blueprint for a National Security Council had made a similar recommendation five years ago 8212; in addition to that of establishing an autonomous think-tank for internal security studies to provide inputs for policy making.
But the key question is: what makes the Indian Army superior in dealing with violent situations that cannot be managed by the police forces? After all, the human resource base for the two or rather three sets of forces is common. The difference essentially lies in the recruitment and training of personnel on one side, and the legal safeguards for the armed forces on the other. The obvious answer lies in ensuring the rationalisation of recruitment and training of police, at the Centre as well as in the states, to be brought at par with that of the Army. It is perhaps not appreciated that our defence forces have for decades followed and continuously improved one of the most scientific and effective systems in the world for recruitment at the officer as well as below officer levels. Fortunately, it is still impervious to political interference.
On the other hand, we need to understand the costs of employing a professional army for counter-terrorism for prolonged periods. Even at the strategic level we experienced the debilitating impact of this problem when aggression by what was clearly the Pakistan army in the Kargil sector in 1999 was assessed as mujahideen terrorism and thus expected to be dealt with in a few days at the most! Professional armies by definition are ill suited to deal with societal violence. The US army is now facing a similar situation in Iraq and the shine from an otherwise brilliant military operation has rapidly rubbed off in skirmishes with an elusive enemy. Doing so within one8217;s own country is even more difficult. It is unfair to expect highly trained men, ready to fight another professional military, to stand guard in islands of security well within the country and go about their normal life to be ready at all times to fight an amorphous enemy whose soldiers come as suicide bombers.
The answer lies in bringing the police, especially the armed police forces, to the level of professional capability that the emergent situation demands. There is no reason why this cannot be achieved in a period of two-three years. De-induction of the Army from internal security and counter-terrorism, therefore, should have taken place by now. Unfortunately we seem to have allowed scope for dilution of the principle and the urgency of its application. For example, in spite of a scientific system of recruitment available and in practice in one segment of the armed forces of the country for decades, the Ministry of Home Affairs was tasked only in 2001 to prepare a 8220;model recruitment procedure8221; for the states.
Meanwhile, the deployment of the Army for internal duties must also conform to the well-established overarching principle followed in letter and spirit in all democratic, civilised modern states including our own: that of civilian control of the military. This principle is even more critical for internal deployment for obvious reasons. This is what the Constitution lays down; and this has once again been emphasised by the Group of Ministers. Unfortunately we still keep hearing of demands from responsible quarters for a change in the principle in the name of 8220;unified command8221;.
But internal security in general and fighting terrorism in particular essentially entail a battle of ideas to be conducted through politico-social means with the use of force available at graduated levels to provide the stability for the war of ideas to take root. That use of force must leave the ultimate instrument of the state, the defence forces, as a choice of last resort rather than one of first option.
