Dangerously disarming

Firstly, the Trishul system, we may recall has been under development for almost two decades. This short- range air defense system was slated to enter service in the early 8216;90s. But like the other two projects of the Integrated Guided Missile Defense Programme 8211; the Akaash and the Nag 8211; it has yet to receive user acceptance.

Second, the DRDO in most instances tends to advocate the indigenous development route against imports. Numerous examples of procurements can be sited where eventually the DRDO8217;s objections have been overruled. Equally, there are cases where the defense forces have accepted the DRDO argument for indigenous development and then have had to wait and wait.

The preceding observations are not to be viewed as an attempt to absolve or to blame but merely to draw attention to the dynamics of the defense procurement system.

The real big problem that somehow seems to have escaped notice is the fallout of our practice to ban companies implicated in defence deals. We banned the Bofors in the 8216;80s consequently the artillery is still looking for a suitable gun. We then banned Denel. The outcome is that again we have a setback to the modernisation of the artillery and the army. The Barak disclosures may result in blacklisting the IAI, which is a supplier to the three services of some vital equipment. And tomorrow we may end up banning Thales because of the Scorpene project. Do we see the magnitude of the problem unfolding?

Clearly the first requirement is to review our policy of banning/blacklisting companies. The knee jerk reaction of a blanket closure of dealings is horribly counterproductive and would soon virtually close most options for force modernisation. We need to evolve a more clinical and objective methodology of dealing with instances of suspected wrongdoing.

The next big challenge for the government is to ensure that all planned procurements for this financial year remain on track. The paralysis that such stories tend to cause must be prevented. This can only happen if there is monitoring and intervention at the highest levels. The derailment of the force modernisation process must not be permitted. If this is demonstrably achieved the morale and the self-confidence of the armed forces will receive the required boost. Importantly the unambiguous message going out would be that we are serious about not permitting the dilution of our military deterrence, an issue that has been receiving considerable attention of late.

For very obvious reasons our policy on defence consultants/agents requires to be revisited. Continued defiance of a universal business practice does not make sense. Some say that in the early 8216;90s the US charged us with following unfair business practices on this account.

The present policy on agents is terribly intrusive and restrictive. Consequently, probably not a single agency has registered itself with the ministry of defense. Yet it is common knowledge that agents are operating. We therefore need to bring about a drastic change. Any registered consulting firm should be authorised to represent both foreign and Indian companies wanting to market their products to our armed forces. Interaction with such consulting firms should be open to all officials in the procurement chain.

The other area of reform is transparency. While claims towards achieving transparency are periodically made, much more needs to be done to achieve its effectiveness. Some procedures have been formulated but in consultation with the CII and other defense multinationals these need to be further refined.

Within the procurement establishment a couple of issues, amongst perhaps many others, merit attention. First is the formulation of system specifications or performance parameters. This is perhaps the most critical function in the procurement chain and we do have an elaborate policy on the subject. But in the implementation infirmities have crept in. To improve this process there are a few suggestions. First is to focus on improving the in house expertise. A very fine mix of operational awareness and technical knowledge is vital to arrive at the right balance while framing operational requirements. We need to do more to nurture proficiency in these fields. The second step is interaction with potential suppliers/manufacturers before firming up on qualitative requirements. Inputs from them will help in realistic and achievable parameters.

The last vital reform is to remove the power of delay from individuals in the chain. This is perhaps the main cause of all problems. Officers delaying the movement of files or returning files on frivolous grounds must be made accountable. And this should apply to every echelon, right from the lowest to the top. This is a small procedural issue and if the will is there it can be easily implemented.

The image of a resurgent India could do well without such mud thrown up periodically at almost every other defence deal. The nation must resolve to create an effective and clean system of procurement. Given the genius and intellect of our people this is hardly a challenge.

The writer was director general, artillery, during the Kargil conflict.