
Mamata Banerjee8217;s coalition of the unwilling in Singur is understandably getting all the headlines. But, as always in Bengal, the main protagonists are the Marxists. The plot has changed, though. For the first time in 30-plus years, the CPM is not the sole manager of Project Bengal.
The party8217;s Bengal project began when a young Mamata may have been deciding whether to be a painter or a politician. A Nano-sized summary of how the CPM managed the fallout of the first major policy, the now mythical land redistribution, can be thus: Marxists were responsible for a fifth of all land redistributed in India; a huge project considering Bengal occupies less than a twentieth of India8217;s land area. An astounding 40 per cent-plus of Bengal8217;s rural population got either no-eviction rights barga or titles to redistributed land patta.
The political management of this big social change was done via sharply increasing the representation of the beneficiaries in the panchayat system. It is not for nothing that the CPM takes panchayat elections in Bengal dead seriously and that dead seriousness often produces dead political opponents.
But, and this is where the CPM often has been a victim of bad analysis in the 8220;bourgeois8221; press, the party was clever enough to realise politics alone won8217;t cut it. Economics was essential. Beginning in the late 8217;70s and up to the middle 8217;90s, agriculture in Bengal grew impressively, with the high-yield boro rice leading the pack and posting double-digit annual growth rates. This was a reddish green revolution 8212; the output growth happened in small plots and with labour intensive techniques. This suited the CPM because land reform had reduced average plot sizes and labour intensive production kept a lot of people employed.
From here on, it is easy to repeat the conventional story. The Bengal CPM didn8217;t need industry because villages had become anytime vote machines and it was not until intelligent, realistic, nice Buddhababu came along that the CPM understood the need for industrial capital. Like any conventional story, bits of truth in this obscure the more fundamental truth. Yes, a variation of class warfare against 8220;big capital8221; was presided over by the party. Which is why between the early 8216;80s and the late 8217;90s, Bengal, along with UP and Bihar, saw negative growth in industrial employment in the organised sector. But this deindustrialisation was a big change as well and, as is seldom appreciated, it had to be managed. The CPM did it by encouraging unorganised, non-rural economic activities.
A fine analysis by Abhirup Sarkar EPW, January 28, 2006 estimates that the share of unregistered manufacture in total manufacturing in Bengal jumped from 30 per cent in the 8217;80s to a staggering 60 per cent in the 8217;90s. Obviously, informal employment went up sharply as well. Sarkar estimates, by taking marginal workers who work less than 183 days a year as the yardstick, that informal employment grew by more than 15 per cent annually in the 8217;90s.
These were people working as small traders, street traders, cabbies, shopkeepers and all their assistants and, as Sarkar points out, all of them face huge job insecurity and frequently have to operate outside formal commercial laws and rules. This huge army of informally employed will respond gratefully to a protector. Enter the CPM. Informal employment increase isn8217;t confined to Bengal. But only in Bengal is there a political set-up ruthless enough to design a wide-ranging social contract and then maximise its benefits.
Therefore, the party had two big political economic paradigms, urban and rural. But one of the CPM8217;s paradigms, as paradigms often do, shifted. Beginning in the early-middle 8217;90s, Bengal started experiencing what always happens with agrarian transformation, of whatever kind: growth petering out. Slowing farm output made the CPM8217;s reddish green strategy look particularly inadequate 8212; when stagnating production meets labour intensive production techniques and small-scale operations, small producers and labour are always big victims. The economic bit of the village political economy wasn8217;t working well because rural income, job creation and consumption started taking a hit.
This was another change, a hugely critical one, the CPM had to manage. Formal industrial employment was the party8217;s answer. A lot of rubbish has been said and written about how the CPM planned this wrong from the very start. More than 60 per cent of Bengal8217;s land is used for cultivation. Even massive industrialisation 8212; let8217;s say a 100 projects the size of Nano8217;s 8212; will occupy less than 1 per cent of agricultural land Sarkar estimates this in another analysis; EPW, April 21, 2007. So the 8220;huge loss of farm land8221; argument is a load of manure.
The use of land acquisition laws to acquire the Singur land discomfited even economic liberals. But negotiating with thousands of owners of very small plots is an understandable turn-off for any capitalist. Ideally, a government should help small landowners form a sellers8217; group and referee the process of price discovery. That way the land acquisition law8217;s bias for underpricing can be corrected. Against this theory is the fact however that a substantial majority of landowners sold their land in Singur.
Therefore Singur wasn8217;t badly managed by the CPM from the start. So it8217;s Mamata 8212; she8217;s the explanation. No, the explanation is that in deciding to encourage formal industrial capital, the CPM perforce opened the windows of a closed political economic world. Here was an outsider whose prosperity didn8217;t depend on the Bengal model, who earns his bread by paying attention to laws and rules, who demands protection, isn8217;t grateful for it.
Such an agent being deployed in the transformation of Bengal means that the CPM8217;s capacity to manage is severely reduced. If Ratan Tata could be told by the CPM to hang around, have a cup of tea, talk football and culture, while it sorts out Mamata, the experienced CPM-watcher would have bet on the party managing Singur, despite Nandigram. But Ratan Tata can8217;t be told to hang around. He has options.
But the CPM, given its way of managing Bengal, doesn8217;t. It is used to being the monopolist in negotiations. It is used to institutions, like panchayats, that will bend to its will. It is used to ignoring or bending laws and rules and used to dealing with agents who like that sort of thing. None of that helps when formal industrial capital gets upset.
That8217;s why the Bengal governor enjoys the CPM8217;s backing when he writes to Ratan Tata. The party knows it can8217;t manage alone on Singur. It also knows that the Bengal model is exhausted. And that if it keeps its invitation to formal industrial capital open, its days as sole manager are over and, by extension, so are its days of all-encompassing politics. Therefore, the most interesting question in Bengal is not whether Mamata will change. It is whether the CPM can change.
saubhik.chakrabartiexpressindia.com