Bill Clinton’s visit to India is to be welcomed as a step towards constructing a new and meaningful Indo-US relationship. Nothing is diminished by his decision to stop over in Islamabad en route home. An American spokesman said on March 8 that, since no one can predict when the next flare-up between India and Pakistan will occur, "the President believes that it is crucial that he carry a message of restraint and dialogue to both capitals". Rising tensions in Jammu and Kashmir signal General Musharraf's compulsions to up the ante and catch Clinton's ear. There is, however, little prospect of war, "limited" or nuclear. India does not want one and Pakistan cannot afford another disaster. Gen Musharraf needs a face-saver as well as some firm advice. Both ways, if Clinton can pass on an appropriate message to Islamabad, his stopover may serve a useful purpose. Clinton has wisely disclaimed any mediatory role in Kashmir. In most Indian eyes, the US (and the West generally) is part of the problem rather than the solution in Kashmir. India did invite international mediation between 1947 and 1967 but, all through the Cold War years, what mattered was not merit or principle but whose side you were on. In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan was again recruited as a frontline state in respect of Afghanistan. The price: tacit US complicity in nuclear proliferation, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the spread of drugs and an uncontrolled flow of small arms despite known leakages. These have played havoc in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India through cross-border terrorism and proxy war. Earlier, the US gratuitously invented a new extension of the CFL/LOC in Jammu and Kashmir from grid reference NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. This gave comfort to Pakistan in its endeavour to grab Siachen, which the Indian Army foiled in 1984. All this is history. The purpose of any fresh American engagement of Pakistan must not once again be artificially to balance it against India. This will only result in more adventurism and `jehadi' fanaticism premised on nuclear blackmail. Indian responses to cross-border aggression, open or sub rosa, cannot be regarded as escalatory and greeted with discredited appeals for "restraint on both sides". It is for Pakistan to refrain from cross-border terrorism and aggression by Pakistani regulars and foreign mercenaries. So this call must be addressed to Islamabad. Should wanton violations persist, then Pakistan and the world must know that India will be free to respond at a time, place and manner of its choosing. This is not to seek a "limited war" but to prevent the one Pakistan has been waging with impunity. There is a burden of responsibility on India as well. Any show of bravado, sabre-rattling or civil belligerence is to play Pakistan's game. India has no quarrel with the people of Pakistan, barring the fundamentalist fringe. It must deal with the government of the day and not seek to quarantine Gen Musharraf in international fora, SAARC and, most important, bilaterally. Atal Behari Vajpayee has held out no nuclear threat. What he said in Jalandhar recently was that, should Pakistan use its "nuclear deterrent", it must expect a credible Indian response. The Prime Minister was not resiling from the declared no-first-use doctrine despite Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar's reported February-end statement that Islamabad had exploited its nuclear deterrent against India on at least three occasions. It would be mistaken to make talks with Pakistan conditional on its vacation of "Azad" Kashmir and the Northern Areas. It is one thing for India to claim continuing sovereignty over these areas until a final settlement. Quite another to give away one's cards before the game commences. If Pakistan desires to return to the Lahore-Shimla framework, it cannot talk peace while waging war or hope to get at the negotiating table what it has recklessly gambled and repeatedly lost in wars of its own making. India must talk on the whole gamut of issues - most certainly including Jammu and Kashmir- dividing the two countries. Kashmir is "disputed" and has remained "internationalised" since 1947. What is at issue is not the fact but the nature of the dispute. Not talking has left India's Kashmir diplomacy in tatters. For years, Pakistan has been enabled to set the agenda, define "Kashmir" and "Kashmiri", rewrite the facts and sequence of events, treat "Azad" Kashmir and the Northern Areas as a closed chapter and trade on long-dead UN resolutions which it aborted at the threshold by total non-implementation. After Kargil, the world too has at last begun to accept that a settlement has to be built around the LoC and the construction of a new intra-Jammu- and-Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan relationship across that international border-in-the-making. Apart from talking to Pakistan, India must dialogue with people of all political hues and from all regions in Jammu and Kashmir. If there is fatigue over proxy war and disenchantment with Pakistan, there is also alienation against the Indian state. This must be addressed. The autonomy issue, Centre-state and intra-regional, cannot be wished away. The twin reports presented on these subjects offer a starting point for discussion. There can be no reneging on what has been a repeated and solemn commitment by successive governments. Finally, the government must talk to the rest of India on the question so that issues are focussed and a consensus forged. Such a triad of initiatives will fashion a new and creative Jammu and Kashmir policy in place of the reactive/proactive law and order approach generally canvassed. Pakistan will find its bluff called, people in the state will respond and the world will applaud. Nobody in Pakistan is ready to self-destruct. Gen Musharraf is in a bind. Lead him to meaningful talks - preferably quiet and through a high-level plenipotentiary - and he may find the exit he seeks. This could help Pakistan to resolve its political, economic and core identity problems and put it on the path of becoming a stable and prosperous partner in a friendly (SAARC) neighbourhood which is what the Partition was meant to achieve.