Both sides don’t see the wood for the trees in the Kargil controversy

Undoubtedly, the Chief of Army Staff is professionally and morally responsible for both military success and failure during his time. Kargil victory apart, some of General V P Malik’s actions during the past few months have been debatable but they do not justify dragging him into the mire of every controversy in retrospect.

The lapse of allowing intrusions into Kargil is indisputable but the fabrication of certain documents, including the November 12, 1998, letter purportedly written by Brig Singh to General Malik, implies a sinister intent.

The fact that the Brigadier put up a direct communication to the Army Chief on June 28, 1999, indicates that nothing prevented him from doing so earlier. The sequence of events indicates that it was only in December and January that professional differences with his Divisional Commander began to show up in their official communications. Thus his approaching the Chief (over the heads of the Corps Commander and the Army Commander) in early November was illogical.

Falsifying letters relating to the services is a serious matter and calls for a thorough probe. But this is by no means the only probe that should have been ordered. Details from the 68-page representation submitted by Brig Singh to the Army Chief on June 28, 1999, following his removal from command, which have been published in The Indian Express settles only one issue: what exactly the brigadier told his superiors. It begs the question: what went wrong and who, if any one, is to blame?

At the same time, inept handling of the issue has done the Army no good. Removing a field commander is the unquestionable prerogative of superior officers, particularly in battle. But a representation against it after the din of the battle is over is understandable. There is the well-known case of Major General Niranjan Prasad–who was removed from command in 1962–having been given command of another division later following his representation. That his performance was found wanting again during the 1965 war is another matter.

In the present case, Brig Singh, after being removed, sought an interview with the Army Chief and filed a detailed representation to his office on June 28. The Army establishment remained insensitive to the aggrieved Brigadier for a full two months. It is only when falsification of documents started that his representation was quickly handed over to the Subrahmanyam Committee.

Media eagerness to unravel military documents apart, whoever decided to publicise and politicise the issue has done neither the security apparatus nor the Brigadier any good. If the Brigadier has done it, he has shot himself in the foot, for it dooms any effort of his rehabilitation.

Yet, the Army’s indifference to his representation for weeks is surprising because the Brigadier’s representation points out not only “injustice” to himself–real or perceived–but also raises other vital issues such as:

It is also apparent that during the battle since the Brigade Commander and the Divisional Commander were pulling in different directions, some drastic action was necessary. But the key question is: who should have faced the axe?

Evidently, the representation contains only the Brigadier’s side of the story, which cannot be taken at face value. While preparing for battle, officers are known to fear the worst for their sector and their superiors have to match their subordinates’ perception with their own and also provide from what is available after taking into account the overall security scenario. Unfortunately in Kargil, Pakistan did spring a surprise and the question which vexes even today is: Who all are responsible for this lapse?

The Brigadier’s superiors and subordinates will have their own side of the story. Even prior to the Kargil war, his Divisional Commander blamed him for a “poor observation profile” of his formation. Some of his subordinates accuse him of having launched troops in the Batalik and Drass sectors without proper assessment of enemy strength and terrain, resulting in heavy casualties. Unfortunately, some of the officers who are making these accusations are–like him–under a cloud. This only confounds the issue.

The committee appointed by the government to go into the Kargil intrusions is headed by a reputed security specialist, K. Subrahmanyam, and its members include a retired lieutenant general, K.K. Hazari, who is a highly respected soldier. But officers feel that the Brigadier’s representation to the Army Chief should have been referred to a military court of inquiry, which should have been ordered as soon as the war was over. Moreover, the Army Chief’s high office would not have been dragged into this mire.

What the Brigadier’s communications are hinting at is an institutional failure of tactical evaluation and command before and during battle. What about his own preparedness? All this calls for a specialised probe by the Army.

The findings of such an inquiry, ideally headed by a lieutenant general from outside the Northern Command (possibly the Vice Chief of Army Staff) would indicate if there were any basis to the Brigadier’s accusations. Officers say that there is more than one precedence of such an inquiry. About a decade ago, Lieutenant General V K Sood, former Vice-Chief, was asked to inquire into charges levelled by a Divisional Commander against his Corps Commander in the Eastern Sector.

In fact, such a military court of inquiry should have been the natural corollary after the war in Kargil, which claimed the lives of 481 soldiers, besides 1145, who were wounded. This in turn could become the basis of a larger and overall inquiry by the Subrahmanyam Committee into lapses, if any, of different intelligence agencies, the intrusions having taken place unnoticed, the initial tardy military reaction, the triumphant response subsequently and the lessons thereof.

It is ironic that we were surprised despite the tactical advantage gained in 1971 when the Army captured and retained 110 sq km of territory at tremendous cost (55 killed, 195 wounded and 28 missing, besides more than 500 cases of frostbite). Apparently this extra cushion of security for the Srinagar-Leh highway was frittered away in the months immediately preceding the conflict.

The end result in Kargil was an excellent example of turning early reverses into victory. The ongoing political shenanigans and quibbling within the field commanders may not exactly fritter away the hard-earned gains, but is bound to have a debilitating effect on the core military values and ethos.