Tags:
Journalism of Courage
As the nation watched Vadodara burn, there was very real trepidation that Gujarat would slip back to the atavistic 2002 moment. That this did not happen was largely thanks to some timely interventions 8212; by both the Centre and Gujarat8217;s chief minister. In 2002 we learnt a bitter lesson from what the governments 8212; in the state and at the Centre 8212; did not do. In 2006 we can learn from what both governments did do. To that extent Vadodara presents a textbook case of how to prevent a bad riot situation from turning worse.
The most important realisation by the chief minister was that these riots could damage him very badly politically, that it was in his interest to quell them at the earliest. The Centre, for its part, also realised that the situation needed quick and effective action rather than finger-pointing and name-calling. The usual recriminations were thankfully therefore much less in evidence this time and there was a joint ownership of the actions taken. The Gujarat government did not resist the prompt deployment of the army and in fact justified its presence by stating that it had wanted such reinforcements because a part of its own forces had been sent out for electoral duties. Again, the CM this time visited Vadodara even while it was burning, met victims from both the Hindu and Muslim communities and personally appealed for peace. That the Centre, too, was alert to the situation was made patent by timely statements. It eschewed the temptation to up the ante, or put the Gujarat government on the defensive. These initiatives brought a sense of confidence to those who felt particularly threatened in the face of rampaging mobs.
