Ayodhya chip, Advani shoulder

For over 10 years, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani has lugged the ghost of a demolished mosque with him, much like Coleridge8217;s ancien...

For over 10 years, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani has lugged the ghost of a demolished mosque with him, much like Coleridge8217;s ancient mariner did his avian nemesis. So far he has managed the sheer weight of it through a strategy of condemning the demolition, while glorifying the movement that gave rise to it. But there is recent evidence that this may not work much longer. Two sets of public statements indicate just how much damage the-ghost-that-clings can still do to his political career.

First, five kar sevaks, now embroiled in endless court hearings, let it be known that leaders like Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi used them to build a political future for themselves. Their accusation was that they were encouraged by these leaders to bring the mosque down. Then there was the recent statement by former UP chief minister Kalyan Singh about how he was betrayed by BJP leaders and duped into signing a false affidavit that the Masjid would be protected. He accused Advani, among others, of sitting in at a brainstorming session at the RSS central office in Delhi on a detailed demolition plan. Both sets of statements have, of course, been dismissed as motivated. But considering that these men are prime witnesses in a tortuous, unedifying court battle over Ayodhya, their testimonies have the power to damage severely a man who could be India8217;s prime minister.

It is widely acknowledged that Advani has been single-handedly responsible for bringing his party to power. He did this through two telling interventions 8212; acting as a force of moderation, in one instance, and of militancy, in the other. If the post-Emergency Janata Party interregnum is considered crucial in having made the erstwhile Jan Sangh more acceptable to voters, it was Advani8217;s letter written from jail on May 13, 1976, urging Jan Sanghis to come out on the side of 8220;amalgamation8221;, that can be regarded as something of a catalyst. As it happened, the 8220;amalgamation8221; gave a Hindu nationalist party a chance to air itself as an arbiter of democracy and, most important, to appear an alternative locus of power.

The second turnaround is better remembered, and it coincided with Advani8217;s ascension to the post of BJP president in May 1986. Right from his first presidential address, when he talked of the Shah Bano affair; through the Vijayawada National Council session of January 1987, where he employed the two crucial words he would use like a whiplash against the Congress, 8220;pseudo-secularism8221; and 8220;minorityism8221;; through the decisive Palampur National Council meeting of June 1989, where Ayodhya was adopted as a party plank; to that famous Somnath Ram rath yatra of September-October 1990, there was no stopping the man who became synonymous with the high noon of Hindu militancy. As Advani8217;s chariot vroomed like a Formula One machine, the BJP8217;s speedometer recorded the gains. From 85 seats in 1989, the party notched 120 seats in 1991, a jump from 11.36 per cent of votes to 20.8 per cent.

But it was precisely at this point that the matrix turned into a maze. A process which Advani seemed to have under control suddenly had him in its thrall instead. That development was the demolition. Amazingly, he did not apparently anticipate it till the very last. Newspaper accounts tell of how he had ended every public speech in the run-up to the December 6 kar seva with the slogan, 8220;Kasam Ram ki khate hain, Mandir wahin banayenge8221;. But when the demolition did occur, he was the quickest to recognise its negative import. He told this newspaper, some 20 days later, that it was one of the most depressing days of his life. The regret, it may be noted, was focused on the manner of the demolition rather than the deed itself. He was to repeat this observation to the Liberhan Commission nine years later: 8220;Many others there were ecstatic, a mood I just could not share.8221;

If the years from 1986 to 1992 saw Advani consciously raise the pitch, it is interesting to follow the de-escalation that followed the demolition. During the campaigning for the 1993 assembly polls, he pointed out that 8220;no party can have credibility if it is seen as a one-issue party8221;. In 1994, he told a newspaper interviewer that the dismantling of the Varanasi mosque was not on BJP8217;s agenda. In a speech in Parliament in August 2000, he spoke of his government8217;s commitment to secularism, repeating the observation that December 6 was the saddest day of his life.

What is equally interesting is that through all these years he defended the idea of the temple mobilisation and his own role in it. True, he no longer claimed that it was the 8220;greatest mass movement8221; in Indian history, but he told the Liberhan Commission that 8220;mobilising people during the Ayodhya movement strengthened the cause of nationalism8221;. As for his own rath yatra, he felt it 8220;brought about social harmony8221;. He could only say this because he also refused to acknowledge the widespread violence and rioting that the rath yatra had unleashed. 8220;I want to put the record straight,8221; he said, 8220;not a single riot or violence took place anywhere during my rath yatra8221;.

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The de-escalation in rhetoric is for a purpose. Advani has given enough hints that he wants to put Ayodhya behind him. If he had his way he would leave the temple unbuilt. As he told the Liberhan Commission, 8220;There is no need to build it because what stands at the disputed site is a temple.8221; But this is where he comes up against the paradox inherent in ethno-religious mobilisation, that Christophe Jaffrelot speaks about in The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics. 8220;Such mobilisation resorts to religious symbols but the political leaders involved in it must preserve their image as statesmen and not appear to depend on religious figures or the more militant activists.8221; The BJP, Advani told the Commission, joined the movement for 8220;political reasons and not out of any religious sentiment8221;.

But it is unlikely that the RSS, VHP, and Bajrang Dal will allow it to be that way: they will continue to insist that the Ram temple remains central to the BJP8217;s political agenda. When the VHP appealed to Advani recently to reiterate his commitment to the mandir, given the fact that he had ridden that famous rath in favour of it, it was only driving this point home. So how will Advani respond? Will he allow himself to be locked in the contradictions of the past that he created through his own divisive brand of political mobilisation, or will he 8212; in his bid to occupy the highest post in the country8212;attempt to break free from the fiends that plagued him for 15 years? We will have to wait and see.