Atomic adolescent

What, then, is holding India back from undertaking a more assertive nuclear policy? That it took so long to declare itself a nuclear weapon state, precisely 34 years after China exploded its first device in 1964, was part of the problem. Having proclaimed itself a nuclear weapon power in 1998, and gained acknowledgement from the US in 2005 that it is a responsible nuclear weapon state, India should be shedding its past inhibitions about taking leadership on the non-proliferation front. Despite voting twice in the International Atomic Energy Agency against Iranian proliferation during 2005-06 and proclaiming that it is opposed to the further spread of weapons of mass destruction, India8217;s nuclear diplomacy finds it hard to break out of self-generated delusions.

Consider the following. Thanks to the long-range missiles transferred to Pakistan by North Korea, all major Indian cities today are within the reach of Islamabad8217;s nuclear arsenal. India was aware since the early 1990s that the dangerous nuclear liaison between North Korea and Pakistan fundamentally threatened Indian security. Yet, India has never been willing to publicly criticise North Korea. Was it because of the presumed principle that India should not criticise fellow 8216;third world8217; countries? Or was it because objecting to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty NPT was a lot easier than criticising those who cheat on it?

For the Indian foreign policy establishment, the domestic political imperative of projecting third world solidarity has often taken precedence over the need to confront those who violate their own international commitments and threaten India8217;s security. But there is a price to pay for this intellectual laziness that is more obsessed with normative principles than real political trends.

On Monday, the Indian Foreign Office has stated that the North Korean nuclear test 8220;highlights the dangers of clandestine proliferation8221;. It is fine to raise the alarm bells on illicit nuclear trade. But what is India doing about it? If India sees itself as a big victim of the nuclear nexus between Islamabad and Pyongyang, why is New Delhi not part of the current global mechanism designed precisely to counter clandestine proliferation?

Today all major nations, except China, are members of the Proliferation Security Initiative PSI, which is a multilateral effort to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. The PSI is based on the recognition that the NPT system has no mechanism to counter clandestine proliferation. Yet, the UPA government has tied itself into knots on the long-overdue decision to join the PSI. If Russia has joined the PSI after initially protesting against it, why is India outside? The government appears frightened to cross the Left which thinks the PSI is not in conformity with international law. One would have assumed that no one but a sophomore would be in awe of 8220;international law8221;. Instead of seeking great power endorsement to curb on-going illicit trade between North Korea and Pakistan, India has let the touching liberal faith in international law trump the demands of national security.

What is true of PSI is equally true of missile defence. In 2001, the NDA government decided to support the Bush administration8217;s plans to develop missile defence against irresponsible regimes, many of whom in fact inhabit India8217;s neighbourhood. Over the last two years, the UPA government has slowly backed off.

Irrespective of the Bush administration8217;s proposals, India had a good case of its own in opting for missile defence. Amidst the Chinese and North Korean transfer of missiles to Pakistan, defensive technologies would have helped complicate Islamabad8217;s nuclear blackmail. Yet, the UPA government has persuaded itself that missile defences are bad because they promote an arms race! In the run up to US President George W. Bush8217;s visit to India last March, Washington was willing to take a few big steps forward on bilateral missile defence cooperation. The UPA government, in its wisdom, said no.

One inevitable consequence of North Korea8217;s nuclear weapons will be the acceleration of missile defence programmes of the United States, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan. Despite their formal opposition to missile defence, both Russia and China are investing massively in the full range of defensive technologies. May be the Left will not oppose missile defence if we buy it from the Russians. Must India be the last Asian power to focus on missile defence, because the sophomores think it is a bad idea?

The North Korean example suggests that even poor and impoverished nations can develop nuclear weapons and missiles. The inevitable diffusion of the 1950s8217; vintage technologies means there will be more, not less, nuclear and missile proliferation in the future. Equally obvious is that a paralysed United Nations Security Council does not have the gumption to confront either North Korea or Iran. What India now needs is a healthy dose of realism in responding to the new challenges of proliferation.

In terms of its own security, India needs to focus on building a more robust nuclear deterrent as well as invest in the next generation of strategic technologies that relate to missile defence. On the external front, India must discard its current tentativeness on combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and join the other great powers in devising new strategies against nuclear proliferation.

Both these tasks demand that nuclear India moves away from rhetoric to responsible action .