
War of Civilisations: Two Volumes
Amaresh Misra
Rupa 038; Co, Rs 2,500
This is a book of great courage and perseverance. Authoring a two-volume magnum opus of more than 2,000 pages, on any subject, is not easy. Amaresh Misra8217;s earlier books on Lucknow and Mangal Pandey establish his interest in events centred on 1857. But first, the warts. A heavy dose of copy editing was required. At times, the style is repetitive, a serious problem if there are 64 chapters. The first volume is better written than the second.
First, the Mughal state came close to 8220;establishing a mercantile industrial capitalism8221;, with the pressure for change emerging from a small town and rural economy that clashed against town capitalism led by big merchants and protected by the bureaucracy. This was a clash between two forms of capitalism. The argument thus turns the conventional approach, influenced by the West, on its head. Novelty is no argument against rejecting a hypothesis. Suffice to say that Misra has marshalled enough evidence to build his case. While the proposition isn8217;t quite proven, it merits serious consideration.
Second, Mughal India didn8217;t exhibit rigidities of caste and religion. A composite and secular social structure had emerged. It was the British who created communalism.
Third, 1857 wasn8217;t a simple sepoy mutiny or a civil rebellion. It was much more broad-based than that and lasted well beyond 1857, all the way into the 20th century. It was a war of civilisations. 8220;The conventional view that Indians lost militarily or politically has to be overhauled8230; Despite everything, Indians could still have won a conventional victory 8212; it was only internal betrayal that probably skewed this possibility.8221;
Fourth, the number of Indians killed has been under-estimated. Computed afresh, figures represent almost a mass genocide. The Misra estimates are 10 million killed 7 per cent of the population in UP, Haryana and Bihar alone. Fifth, several post-1947 developments in India and Pakistan can be traced to 1857. Sixth, outside the subcontinent, the 1857 struggle resonates in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America too.
Misra8217;s political ideology comes across in these propositions. There is nothing wrong with that, unless it leads to subjective biases. 8220;It was the 1857 fear that forced British and Indian liberals, like Dadbhai sic Naoroji, to establish the Congress as a safety valve, capable of deflecting Indian revolutionary energies8230; It is clear that the British left India for they feared another 1857; the reformist leadership of both the Muslim League and the Congress also feared such a prospect 8212; around 1947, a new 1857, would have meant a new, Hindu-Muslim unity 8212; there would have been no Partition.8221;
Personally, I find that the first four propositions have been far better established than the last two, though the figures can still be accused of being somewhat back-of-the-envelope. However, there is yet another proposition that transcends all these and this is of 1857 being under-researched, with clicheacute;d perspectives taken for granted. 8220;Despite the instance of the chapters bringing forth hitherto unpublished material and a new look at the available, published, primary and secondary sources, 1857 research is still on a preliminary level; at the end, there are more questions than answers.8221; Against this background, this monumental work can be described as near-seminal.