Book: Honour and Fidelity: India’s Military Contribution to the Great War, 1914-1918 Author: Amarinder Singh Publishers: Roli Books Pages: 432 Price: Rs 595 In the run-up to the centenary of the First World War, books have been pouring out of presses in Britain, America and elsewhere. It is safe to assume that the flood will continue unabated for the next four years. In India, however, there has been scarcely a ripple. Our contribution to the writing on the war on its centenary seems inversely proportional to the role played by India in the war itself. A large part of the problem is the lack of interest among professional historians of India. The fact that over a million Indians fought on the side of the British empire makes it an uncongenial subject; South Asian historians of all stripes are more interested in people who resisted the imperial power than those who collaborated with it. In this fallow historical field, Amarinder Singh’s volume is a timely and welcome contribution. Singh is not only an active politician, but a former military officer from a regiment that participated in the war as well as the author of other books on military history. The book is very much a traditional military history — covering the various campaigns in which the Indian army fought. Nevertheless, it provides a serviceable account of the Indian army in the war. The book begins with a crisp description of the army’s mobilisation for war. Although two infantry divisions were dispatched to the Western Front quite quickly, the Indian army was not kitted out for fighting in Europe. The rifles used by Indian units were so old that appropriate ammunition could not be found. In consequence, the battalions were handed new rifles on arrival in Marseilles. Moreover, “there were no howitzers, no mechanical transport, a scant supply of medical equipment and signalling apparatus, and innumerable other shortages”. Such was the state of the Indian Expeditionary Force that reached the Western Front to stabilise the collapsing British line. As Curzon would later note, “the Indian Expeditionary Force arrived in the nick of time… it helped to save the cause both of the Allies and of civilisation.” Yet, the fact remains that the Indian force was hardly prepared to fight an industrial war against a formidable opponent. In the years preceding the War, the Indian army had been divided into three parts. A large Internal Security Force had been maintained since the rebellion of 1857 to protect the Raj. The Covering Troops were deployed to maintain order among the restive tribes of the North-West Frontier. And a Field Force was kept ready to fight outside the frontiers of India, mainly in Afghanistan. It was the last that provided the Expeditionary Force that sailed to France. Nothing in their training and equipment, readiness and plans prepared the divisions for the Western Front. The Indian units fought bravely, but suffered grievously. The two Indian divisions that fought in France for under a year comprised nearly 24,000 men. In the same year, these divisions received around 30,000 replacements from India. In other words, they suffered casualty rates of well over 100 per cent. The book also tells us about the Indian army’s role in other theatres of the war: East Africa, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Gallipoli, Egypt, Palestine and Syria. In each of these places, too, the Indian army fought under unfamiliar conditions and under considerable logistical constraints. The surrender at Kut al Amara — one of the lowest points in the war for the Indian army — was as much due to these problems as poor leadership or operational performance. An interesting question that leaps out of the book is how the Indian army managed to learn on the job and transform itself into an effective fighting force. Unfortunately, the book’s relentless focus on battles and campaigns detracts from the consideration of such issues. More problematic is the absence of any sustained discussion of how the Indian army expanded during the War and what this implied for its operational performance. From about 1,55,000 at the onset of war, the army swelled at one point to 5,73,000 combatants. In all, India provided over 1.27 million men, including 8,27,000 combatants. Such extraordinary expansion came at the cost of diluting the quality of the men coming into the army. How were these men trained and turned into efficient soldiers? Then there is the question of what made these men fight. Pecuniary incentives were certainly important. But notions of izzat — which operated both as the quest to uphold honour and avoid shame — also played a key role in motivating the soldiers. As the book’s title suggests, this was central to their experience. But we need a more systematic account of these dimensions of the war. Hopefully, some historian will oblige us before the centenary runs out. Srinath Raghavan is senior fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
