Home Minister Amit Shah chairs a meeting to review the J&K security situation, in New Delhi Tuesday. (Image source: PTI)Lack of adequate actionable intelligence on infiltration of terrorists and their sustenance, thinning of security forces in the hinterland and an increasing influx of narcotics are among the reasons for the high intensity attacks on security forces in Poonch, Rajouri and Jammu, three border districts of the Jammu region, top security and government officials have told The Indian Express.
This, the officials said, has prompted a reassessment of the deployment of troops and the existing methodology of counter-insurgency operations in the area.
In the last two years, this belt that lies south of the Pir Panjal range has seen high visibility terror attacks though fewer in numbers than the Valley.
Starting October 2021, when nine soldiers were killed in the forests between Bhata Durian and Dehra Ki Gali in two separate firefights, to the terror attack in Poonch last month in which four soldiers were killed, five Army personnel, on an average, have been killed in each of these attacks but in almost all instances, the perpetrators managed to escape.
These attacks, together with the death of three civilians in custody, allegedly during questioning of detained men in the wake of the Poonch attack, has led to a shakeup in the local command structure. Three officers have been removed from their posts and an internal inquiry is underway to investigate the circumstances which led to the incident.
According to officials, the Poonch terror attack, around seven months after a similar ambush of Army troops in the same region, has substantiated the presence of terrorists in the region and their ability to evade capture after the strikes.
“This indicates that they are extremely well trained and motivated and have been either able to get internal support for sustenance or gather intelligence on military movements,” an official said.
The official said the fact that the terrorists have been able to remain undetected indicates a lack of actionable intelligence on their presence or on the mode of their infiltration and replenishment while they are in the region. “Instead, they should have been on the run and should have exhausted all resources and support to have had the ability to strike again after an attack,” the official said.
Another official said that as terrorists change their tactics, the military also needs to review its standard operating procedure and evolve with better plans and tactics to deal with the challenges.
The lack of actionable intelligence adds to the traditional challenges of the region which geographically favours all-weather infiltration due to the presence of rivulets, forests and gaps in the Line of Control fence.
Moreover, villages ahead of the fence allow infiltrators from across the border to melt into the local population easily without getting tracked. Multiple small tracks allow their movement into the vast hinterland which provides them places to hide due to the lay of the land, dense forests and natural caves. The connectivity to Poonch, Jammu and across the Pir Panjal range into the Valley provides them an advantage.
An official said that the thinning of overall security forces in the region in the wake of relative calm has led to gaps in the region. “Moving out of a Rashtriya Rifles force to Ladakh had thinned the overall density of troops on ground. Moreover, there has been a greater focus on the LoC instead of the hinterland,” the official said.
“This thinning down of troops from the hinterland has clearly led to a disconnect between the troops and the local population,” the official said.
“Earlier, the troops deployed in the hinterland were rigorous in maintaining the databases of villagers, went for regular patrols and were in touch with the ground for all possible information. The thinning of troops in the hinterland as well as focus shifting primarily to the LoC has impacted this,” the official said, adding that most intelligence efforts have also been focussed on engineering operations as against analysing inputs which the area has been organically throwing up.
“The role of other security forces in filling up this gap also needs to be evaluated,” the official said. The other impact this has had is troop fatigue and, at times, laxity due to the numerous routes and long route opening patrols.
Another contributing factor is the rising number of instances of drones ferrying weapons, ammunition, money and drugs from across the border to support these terror attacks, officials said. Last month, a drone carrying weapons and ammunition was recovered from Jammu’s Akhnoor region.
“Their sale has made financing terror operations easier, giving terrorists adequate funds to influence or buy sympathisers and cater to their needs,” one of the officials said.
The Army, officials said, is looking to reassess deployment in the region and examine the loopholes. The options include readjustment of RR troops and deployment from reserve formations to fill up the void in the hinterland and re-examine counter-insurgency tactics employed in line with the changing terror tactics.
“Counter-terrorism necessitates constant evolving of tactics and operational methodology so as to get ahead of the terrorists who always have the advantage of surprise on their side,” an official said.
According to the official, procuring more drones for surveillance and anti-drone systems to counter the influx of weapons and replenishment through drones at the command level and a greater inter-agency coordination are the need of the hour.