Behind terror dip in Kashmir: Sprawling security net and a hard clampdown

There are several factors to the sense of “control” established in Kashmir over the last five years, sources in the security establishment said. From cutting the wings of mainstream political parties to a hard stop of recruitment to local militant ranks, cracking down on separatists, booking supporters of militants under the stringent anti-terror law UAPA, and holding back service verifications for those with alleged links to militancy, the government trained its guns on what it calls the “terror ecosystem”.
Besides bringing J&K directly under the Centre’s control as an UT without an elected government, first and foremost was the manner in which the government “reduced the play that the mainstream political parties enjoyed with the Centre”.

“The parties acted as a buffer between the people and the Centre. Also, those who were aligned with the separatist ideology, who said that they don’t believe in the Constitution of India, also realised that the ground had shifted because then you cannot claim you need 370 which is part of the Constitution. So the discrediting of the separatist ideology, space and parties was also achieved,” a senior J&K administration source said.

This, they claim, began in 2016 with the late separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani refusing to meet an all-party delegation led by then Home Minister Rajnath Singh. “This sort of led to the thinking that the doors of negotiations would now be shut,” the source said.

After 2019, the security apparatus also underwent a strategic shift in moving from attacking “active militants” to attacking “the terror ecosystem”. Here, the key actions relate to cutting off recruitment to militant ranks. “The nodal point of this were the large funerals allowed for deceased militants. Those funerals became a rallying point to recruit new individuals ready to replace those who were killed,” a senior officer told The Indian Express.

At the time, the outbreak of the Covid pandemic became the “alibi” for not returning militant’s bodies to their families and, in turn, taking away the possibility of large funerals beginning in April 2020. This has since become a precedent and officials believe that slowly “social sanction has emerged around this with the acceptance that the families of militants will not be given their bodies.”

The bodies of local militants killed in encounters since have been buried in separate graveyards in the presence of their families wherever possible.

Meanwhile, those involved in providing “shelter, weapons and logistics” have been systematically targeted under Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), not just the Public Safety Act (PSA).

“While PSA is an executive detention, under UAPA, it is a more stringent but accountable detention,” a source said. From 2021, the capacity of the police to conduct more thorough investigations was prioritised. First, the government created a State Investigation Agency (SIA) on the lines of the National Investigation Agency. Sometime later, Special Investigation Units (SIUs) were established at the district level to ensure proper investigation to secure convictions in the courts.

“Earlier cases would be registered but the personnel in-charge would not be equipped to handle investigations. Officers were brought in from the NIA to assist with capacity-building and training, which includes proper evidence collection, witness attendance and briefing and writing of chargesheets among other technical aspects to create dedicated police teams,” a senior police official said.

So, while the earlier police focus was on fighting terror through “militaristic means,” efforts were made to shift to bring a “procedural focus” to cases of terror.
Additionally, use of UAPA also provided the police “exceptional powers” such as property attachment. Over the last four years, properties of several organisations and individuals have been attached by the J&K Police. This began in 2022 with the police in Srinagar attaching five residential properties on charges of “wilful harbouring of militants”.

The attachment of the properties entails that these structures cannot be transferred, leased or sold in any manner, “except with the prior permission of the DGP of J&K police.” Another aspect of this is “weaponisation of verifications” — not just for seeking travel documents but also to scrutinise previous and future appointments, sources said.

Focus is also trained on schools and identification of teachers with separatist tilt. At least 50 “such teachers” have had to go through transfers from Kashmir to Jammu or remote locations within Kashmir. This, sources said, is with the aim to send a message to all that the administration is aware of your activities and is watching.

J&K DG RR Swain believes that “disorderliness is caused by a handful of bullies”. “The State is mandated to enforce law and order. We need to have a built-in dis-incentive for joining terror groups in public interest. Conversely, we need to have built-in incentives for not joining,” he said.

With the security grid in Kashmir “in far better shape” than in Jammu, sources claim that forces are also more aware of mobility patterns of militants in the Valley. “In Jammu, the force concentration is weaker and therefore it takes time to organise a response to an attack,” sources said.

This relative calm in Kashmir, however, belies the fact that civilians, specially outsiders and Kashmiri Pandits, have been militant targets for the past five years. More than 160 civilians have been killed in the Valley since 2019 in terror-related violence. A large number of these are labourers and artisans who come to earn a livelihood in Kashmir from across the country.

Lack of political representation on the ground has meant further alienation of people who are upset with the abrogation Articles 370 and 35A. The victory of Engineer Rashid — a politician with separatist tilt and in jail for the past five years over terror funding charges — against conventional political stalwarts such as Omar Abdullah and Sajjad Lone, many argue, is a sign that anger in the Valley remains latent and the “control” has been brought largely through security measures.

(With inputs from Deeptiman Tiwary in New Delhi)