A major difference between the first (1996-2004) and second phases (2014 onward) of the BJP’s electoral success is in the size of the party’s social base. The BJP, which was earlier largely seen as a Bania-Brahmin party, or a party of urban upper castes and upper classes, now has a much wider base.
The BJP’s all-India vote share in the Lok Sabha election of 2019 (37.6%) was almost double that of 2009 (18.6%). This was largely due to the inroads the party made among the Other Backward Classes (OBC) — along with Adivasis and Dalits — while retaining its core support base among the upper castes.
Among OBCs, the BJP gained ground especially among the lower OBCs, a group of castes with small individual populations, but who together constitute the larger section of OBCs.
Data from various surveys carried out by Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) show some clear trends.
The expansion of the BJP’s base among OBCs has come at the cost of both the Congress and the regional parties, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.
Between 1996 and 2009, the dominant regional parties with core support among the backward castes — such as the RJD and JD(U) in Bihar, and the SP in UP — got the biggest share of OBC votes, with the rest more or less equally divided between the Congress and BJP.
In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the BJP (34%) won more than double the Congress’s share (15%) of the OBC vote. The trend of OBCs voting for the BJP intensified (44%) in 2019, with the party taking a chunk out of the regional parties’ share.
The Lokniti-CSDS Mood of the Nation Survey 2023 in May indicated a further shift of the OBCs towards the BJP. The survey showed the Congress gaining support among OBCs — however, this increased support came largely from the southern states (Figure 1).
In bipolar contests, the BJP has mostly got greater OBC support than the Congress. In the 2023 survey, this support touched 72%, compared to just 18% for the Congress (Figure 2).
Since 2014, the BJP has got greater support from lower backward castes than from the more powerful OBCs (such as the Yadavs in UP and Bihar). Figure 3 shows 43% of lower OBCs voted for the BJP in 2014, and this figure had risen to 50% in May 2023. For the upper OBCs, these numbers were 30% and 40% respectively.
The Congress too has somewhat more support among lower OBCs than among the upper OBCs (Figure 3). This is mainly because upper OBCs are more committed to the regional parties compared to the lower OBCs (Figure 5).
In BJP-Congress bipolar contests, upper and lower OBCs support to the two parties is more or less similar. (72% each among both upper and lower OBCs for BJP, and 20% and 17% respectively for Congress in May 2023; Figure 4.)
Figures 6-8 show the increasing support for the BJP among OBCs in Bihar, and especially among the lower OBCs since 2014. The RJD and JD(U) get votes among all OBCs, but they remain more popular among the upper OBCs.
Note, however, that over the last decade, Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, who has support among the lower backwards especially, has switched from the RJD to the BJP and back to the RJD, which complicates the picture.
The data from Bihar are especially relevant because of the results of the caste survey released this week. The results show that the Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs) — a defined sub-category of lower OBCs which includes more than 100 castes — comprise 36% of the population, while upper OBCs are 27%.
OBC support has played a major role in helping the BJP emerge as the dominant force in Indian politics. OBCs are a large section of the population in many states, and the BJP has given them — especially lower OBCs — adequate representation in party tickets and platforms.
While a dent in its OBC support would not necessarily mean defeat for the BJP, it will certainly not be able to retain its dominance in the Hindi belt. The Bihar caste survey will become a rallying point for regional parties, and could increase the pressure on the BJP to announce an all-India caste census.
And yet, this moment is not Mandal 2.0. This is because 2023 is not 1990, and the OBCs are divided among the upper and lower backwards, which is evident in the ways these castes have been voting. It is likely that the issue of the caste survey will be short-lived, and other issues will surface on the ground ahead of next year’s Lok Sabha elections.
Sanjay Kumar is Professor and Co-Director of the Lokniti research programme at CSDS