Prolonged grounding of the Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) calls for tough decisions – here’s why

A prominent red flag in the operational exploitation of any flying machine is an “aircraft on ground” (AOG) event. It denotes the grounding of the aircraft due to non-availability of an essential spare or rotable and will demand the highest priority at every level to liquidate. Repeated AOG occurrences and/ or inordinate delay in liquidating AOG can be indicative of a poorly developed op-logistic chain, flawed contract, or a product that is yet to mature.

Another event that any operator across the civil-military spectrum would want to avoid at any cost is a serious defect that potentially grounds the aircraft. Commercially, it can spell doom both for the operator and manufacturer and dent the balance sheet like nothing else. Military operators who have to defend borders instead of bottom lines will pay this cost in terms of a blunted operational edge.

In two decades-plus of operations of the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv, these two events have been normalised to an extent that commercial operators would find irreconcilable if not laughable.

This could be the longest grounding ever

As per reports in the media, the entire fleet of 330+ ALH that have been grounded since the January 5 crash of CG 859 at Porbandar are likely to remain grounded for at least another three months.

The grounding was recommended this time by the manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), after preliminary analysis of the flight data recorder indicated that the helicopter did not respond to the pilot’s inputs in the seconds preceding the fatal crash. The fault was later traced to a fracture in the swash plate assembly in the upper controls housed inside the ALH’s Integrated Dynamic System (IDS).

Three months later, HAL seems to be no closer to nailing the issue. Users are now looking at possibly the longest-ever grounding of the fleet.

A very serious operational handicap

The challenges that such groundings impose on users are hardly known to the public since the Indian military constitutes the predominant user of this machine.

The ALH provide shore-based and organic search and rescue (SAR) capability to vital arms of the military. Their reach and capability cannot be matched by the humble Chetaks and Cheetahs. Frontline fighter assets of the armed forces are now likely flying with inadequate SAR cover.

The Indian Coast Guard that has to surveil our vast Exclusive Economic Zone and provide 24/7/365 SAR cover are deprived of their most potent weapon. Remote military posts that can only be maintained by helicopters are now dependent on the dwindling fleet of Chetak/ Cheetah and the Mi-17 family already beset with AOGs due to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War.

Owing to its large numbers and design envelope, the first responder in any emergency or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) scenario is usually the ALH. That gap remains fragile as ever. Commanders who have to deal with bellicose neighbours and face-offs at Himalayan heights are deprived of their promised capability of weaponised ALH Mk4 Rudras and LCH Prachand helicopters.

Pilots are also grounded, and rapidly losing currency

The human element also begs a mention. Thousands of aircrew would have lost their currency by now, even if their proficiency is maintained somewhat through simulator training. They would most probably be deployed for mundane secondary duties at units and air stations.

In the absence of any tangible progress in fixing root causes, commanding officers have to keep aircrew meaningfully engaged and not let their faith in the machine erode. When the grounding lifts, the southwest monsoon will likely be in full fury. The dice is heavily loaded against both the men and their machines.

In a way, we are fortunate to be in peacetime. Any serious commercial operator of this machine would have shut shop or booked replacements by now.

All that is wrong: opaqueness, lack of competition, and more

Against this backdrop, one expects concrete changes and regular updates, both of which have been routinely missing in the chequered history of the ALH.

With all meaningful data opaque to anyone outside the secure walls of agencies nested inside the Ministry of Defence (MoD), HAL ends up being judge, jury, and executioner for its own foibles each time. Certification and quality assurance agencies vested with oversight have their own internal affiliations and “Make in India” compulsions, operating under the same DRDO/ DDP umbrella. This sets the field for complacency and conflict of interest.

Since there are hardly any serious domestic civil operators of the ALH nor any commercial export customers, there is an absolute lack of competition and little incentive to innovate or make major design iterations.

This to my mind has proven to be the undoing of this aspirational machine and its makers. It could well be the reason why three decades and 400,000 flying hours later, ALH and its designers are being dragged to the drawing board repeatedly, with no appetite for anything other than band-aid remedies.

Time for band-aid remedies gone, all options must be on table

The services must call time on meaningless excuses and stopgap fixes that have eroded trust in the machine. “We operate from sea level to Siachen Glacier” can no longer be a valid explanation or acceptable justification. The ALH is not in the developmental stage any more than the Maruti car is. The latter matured in a competitive environment through meaningful collaborations while the former is still a work in progress.

The exuberance around IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed, and Manufactured) is well understood. But HAL being the preordained one-stop-shop for all of Indian military rotary wing requirements should come with more transparency and definitely greater accountability. We cannot produce world-class helicopters in a captive environment where the top line is celebrated while the bottom line is glossed over.

As investigation into the latest crash proceeds, all options should be on the table, including major design changes or seeking alternatives to conflicting requirements of different users. The lessons learnt from the journey thus far should inform programs that are on the anvil – Utility Helicopters-Maritime (UHM), Deck-Based Multi-role Helicopter (DBMRH), Indian Multi-role Helicopter (IMRH). It is for the users and MoD to decide if we are headed in the right direction or under the hypnotism of sunk-cost fallacy.

Cdr KP Sanjeev Kumar (Retd) is a former Naval helicopter test pilot. He posts on X at @realkaypius. These are his personal views.