Managing the border

India-China agreement is a step towards stabilisation. But it is no substitute for early dispute resolution.

India-China agreement is a step towards stabilisation. But it is no substitute for early dispute resolution.

The border defence cooperation agreement (BDCA) signed on Wednesday,during Prime Minister Manmohan Singhs visit to China,has invited both applause and derision. Some are hailing it as a landmark agreement for its promise to prevent the kind of military stand-off seen in Ladakh earlier this year. Critics have denounced it as one more case of Indias meek surrender to China. They insist that the agreement reflects Delhis inability to stand up to the growing Chinese military pressure on the long and contested border. Meanwhile,sceptics say the agreement is yet another border pact India has signed many over the last quarter of a century that adds to the process but does not change the substance on the ground.

A careful reading of the new agreement suggests it is neither a political triumph nor a diplomatic disaster. It is a small but important step towards the stabilisation of the disputed boundary with China. It lays out a variety of mechanisms for exchange of information,better communication and consultation at all levels of the armed forces,procedures for avoiding military confrontation when patrols run into each other,and identifies some areas for cooperation in the border regions. The sceptics,however,can only be proved wrong if the new agreement turns out to be more effective than those signed earlier.

In fact,the BDCA is a response to the fact that the previous agreements on managing the border did not work. Way back in 1988,Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the Chinese leader,Deng Xiaoping,agreed to maintain peace on the frontier even as they ordered talks to resolve the boundary dispute. Delhi and Beijing signed a number of military confidence-building agreements in 1993,1996 and 2005 in order to keep the border tranquil. But most of their provisions could not be implemented because there was no agreement on the delineation of the Line of Actual Control. More importantly,the nature of the border has fundamentally changed in the last decade. The modernisation of the Chinese military and the transport infrastructure in Tibet has brought the Peoples Liberation Army closer to the border. As the PLA cashes in on its new advantages,Delhi is playing catch up. While the new agreement may be more practical than the previous ones in mitigating some of the trouble,it is not a substitute for an early resolution of the boundary dispute. Nor does it in any way lessen the urgency of modernising Indias own military capabilities and general infrastructure on the northern borders.