Why India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960

On August 30 this year, India formally notified Pakistan of its request for a “review and modification” of the treaty. In response, Pakistan reaffirmed that it considers the treaty “important” and hopes that India will comply with the provisions of the bilateral agreement signed 64 years ago.

About the Indus

The Indus River has been integral to the Indus Valley Civilisation, one of the world’s earliest urban cultures, which thrived around 2500 BCE. This majestic waterway springs from Southwestern Tibet, near Lake Mansarovar, meandering through the stunning landscapes of Kashmir before flowing into the lush fields of Punjab and ultimately spilling into the Arabian Sea.

Major tributaries, including the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Beas rivers, significantly contribute to the Indus’s flow and impact agricultural practices in the region.

The dispute

In Indus Divided: India, Pakistan and the River Basin Dispute, environmental historian Daniel Haines describes 1948 as a particularly challenging year for the residents of Pakistan’s West Punjab province, who relied heavily on artificial canals for irrigation. Citing an article from the national newspaper Karachi Dawn, Haines quotes: “As a blazing sun poured itself over the dry and parched lands of Montgomery and Lahore, anxious and overwrought people of the province asked, ‘When will the canal water come?’”

The headworks allowing engineers to divert river water into these canals were located in Indian East Punjab, giving India significant control over Pakistan’s water supply.

At that time, Indian leaders claimed complete ownership of all river water within their territory. “By that logic, Indian engineers could do what they liked with the River Sutlej, which fed canals in both Punjabs, even if its actions reduced the water available in downstream Pakistan” notes Haines. Conversely, Pakistan asserted its established rights to Sutlej water, demanding that Indian actions not diminish downstream levels. This was especially significant for two of Pakistan’s key irrigation projects: Madhopur on the Ravi and Ferozepur on the Sutlej, both situated in India.

The dispute soon included all major rivers of the Indus Basin: the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. After Independence in 1947, the new international border divided the northern mountainous regions — where most river water originates — from the southern delta, making these rivers potential flashpoints for conflict between India and Pakistan.

Water resources were vital for fostering economic growth in these newly independent states. “The story of the Indus dispute therefore,” argues Haines, “encompasses water both as a wet, flowing material substance that engineers could divert and farmers could use, and the relationship between rivers, territory and state space.”

The settlement

Negotiations facilitated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) culminated in the signing of the Indus Water Treaty on September 19, 1960. Under the treaty’s provisions, while India was granted unrestricted access to the water from the ‘Eastern Rivers’ — the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi — Pakistan retained rights to the water from the ‘Western Rivers,’ including the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab.

This agreement sought to ensure equitable water distribution amid growing tensions between the two nations. However, John Vater, a research associate at the National University of Singapore, argues in his paper The Indus Waters Treaty: Prospects for India-Pakistan Peace, that India gained significant strategic advantages by being situated upstream on all six rivers. In contrast, Pakistan’s lower geographical position—regarding both the Indus in India and the Kabul River in Afghanistan—rendered it reliant on its neighbours for water.

Significance and concerns

As the only major cross-border water-sharing treaty in Asia, the Indus Water Treaty plays a crucial role in maintaining peace between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Despite the wars of 1965 and 1971 and various geopolitical tensions, both nations have consistently upheld the treaty.

However, Pakistan’s objections to two of India’s hydroelectric projects — the Kishanganga project on the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum, and the Ratle project on the Chenab — have created ongoing tensions. Pakistan claims these projects could impact water flow into its territory, particularly concerning irrigation needs.

Compounding these issues are persistent concerns about climate change, which threaten the treaty’s long-term viability. As the planet heats up, the glaciers that nourish the Indus Basin — from the Himalayas, Karakoram, Hindu Kush, and Western Tibet — are melting. Vater argues that while India might initially enjoy a water windfall and Pakistan remains steady, the long-term outlook is less rosy: the rivers’ peak flow will dwindle. Adding to this uncertainty are the whims of monsoon rains and extreme weather, which could lead to flash floods, displacing communities and prompting migrations.

He suggests, “India and Pakistan should therefore fulfil not just the technical stipulations of the treaty but also its underlying spirit: to foster a subcontinental community of peace and prosperity.”

While the challenges of water distribution have long-defined relations in the Indus Basin, the potential for cooperation and adaptation remains.