Opinion The significance of S Jaishankar’s Australia visit

But Jaishankar’s visit is beyond the bilateral; what draws him for his first visit to Melbourne, in his current role, is the meeting of the Quad Foreign Ministers from Australia, Japan, United States and India, in person after more than two years. As the foreign ministers of this new, still-unblemished alloy arrive in Australia, a region that geographers of the old Empire had once described as the Antipodes — so distant and different as it was to their world — they do so in the realisation that this is the new centre of gravity and gravitas of international politics and the quest for balance and resilience in the face of strategic competition; of economics, markets and supply chains; of the battle against common challenges, including climate change, cyber security and Covid; and of ideas and innovation for a more habitable planet.

Understandably, Melbourne, voted consistently as one of the most liveable cities on the planet, recovering its joie de vivre after the pandemic — with a robust multiculturalism that includes a China Town and a Little India — is the natural setting this week for the critical discussions about these challenges to our planet and to the future of our region and beyond.

Bilateralism and multilateralism have not come easy for India. It is tempting to forget history, even be amnesiac about recent times, in the flood of affection that prevails today between New Delhi and Canberra. But it was just over a decade ago, in February 2010 that a prominent Indian news magazine ran a cover story on “Why the Aussies Hate Us” as attacks on Indian students in Melbourne led to a nadir in bilateral relations already at a low after Canberra’s ferocious response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998.

Today, however, it is difficult to find a single significant issue on which India and Australia have positions dramatically different from each other, and this convergence transcends the partisan divide in Canberra.

The Indian diaspora is finally coming of age in Australia; the population of Indian-born people has doubled in the last decade, and for the last five years, India remains the top source of skilled migration. The tourist and student traffic from India, which had been impacted by the sealing of Australia’s borders because of Covid, should revive after the full opening of borders later this month.
The one bridge that is still to be built is of a robust bilateral economic relationship. Corporate Australia still finds it difficult to do business with India and the “champions” for the business relationship (identified by Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) need to really position themselves in the vanguard of the relationship.

However, niggardly bureaucrats from both sides have prevented an even “early harvest” minimal free trade agreement (termed in bureaucratese as CECA — Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement) from being signed despite political will and many deadlines. This agreement must be concluded at the earliest.

The bilateralism merges seamlessly into the multilateral agenda for the Quad, which formally or on the sidelines, will spend much of its time devoted to Beijing, its belligerence, its revisionism and its revanchism across the region. India and Australia have both been victims of the persistent wolf-warrior diplomacy of Xi Jinping’s China.

The concern about China has been aggravated by the increased levels of economic dependence on China. Recall that India, Australia and Japan had agreed to reduce their dependence on China and diverse supply chains through Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI).
The three countries had met in September 2021 to set into place mechanisms for trade diversification, to reduce their dependence on Chinese markets for medical supplies and other finished goods during the pandemic. While the jury is still out on the long-term success of SCRI, prima facie the dependence on China has not reduced in any significant manner even while the overall trade deficit has increased.

While the agenda of the Quad is broad, the challenge is to remain focussed on the Indo-Pacific, its stability, and not be distracted, for instance, by the shenanigans of Vladimir Putin’s Russia in Ukraine or prematurely anticipate a military alliance being forged because of the flirtations of Xi and Putin, two of the most unlikely candidates for a serious relationship or even a tempestuous affair.

Regions are markers of geography but also constructions of a cartographic imagination. You imagine your neighbourhood as much as by where you are positioned, as by where you want to be. Your geographical compass, in sum, reflects your threats and your opportunities, your ambitions and your vulnerabilities — a distinct weltanschauung. On his first visit to Australia as India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, will have the opportunity to put a real imprimatur on two relationships that he has helped to craft: The Quad and bilateral ties with the government in Canberra. What is now vital is to demonstrate that these partnerships can truly deliver on transforming the reality on the ground by giving the Quad real substance and the Indo-Pacific a fighting chance at stability despite now predictable Chinese subversiveness.

This column first appeared in the print edition on February 10, 2022 under the title ‘Possibilities Down Under’. The writer is Professor at JNU and University of Melbourne and former Founder-Director of the Australia India Institute