Opinion With summer approaching, will the India-China border still see friction post-disengagement?

However, whether the border will see the tensions akin to those in the summer of 2020 and the years since is far less certain, and in my view, unlikely at this juncture. The situation in 2020 was qualitatively different from any of the standoffs that came before it in the past decade. It was different in that China attempted to change the status quo in seven separate locations along the border, through a large-scale induction of troops (including in previously undisputed areas). Then, as Defence Minister Rajnath Singh announced to the Lok Sabha in September 2020, “the violent conduct of Chinese forces” was in “complete violation of all mutually agreed norms.” The Galwan incident which led to combat deaths — particularly of 20 Indian soldiers — was the first such incident on the border in four decades. These developments were cumulatively treated as a “serious disturbance” by India. It led to India freezing the broader bilateral relationship with China and counter-escalating in August-September 2020 to compel China to disengage at the border.

Cut to the present, where both sides have invested significant diplomatic, military, and political capital over the past five years in bringing ties to the present state of a nascent normalisation. This includes, but is not limited to, 27 interactions at the politico-strategic level (foreign ministers, defence ministers, national security advisors, foreign secretary-vice minister, and heads of government), 18 meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) and 22 rounds of corps commander-level talks. These talks have resulted in disengagement from the seven friction points of the standoff, and have paved the way for a resumption of broader India-China exchanges in the economic, political, and people-to-people domains. Given that China has advocated for resuming these exchanges for the past two years, it is difficult to imagine it undertaking any serious escalation at this juncture that risks rolling back this progress.

Beyond this, the factors that have facilitated the Himalayan climbdown over the past year, persist. From the Chinese perspective, these include foremost, hedging against the uncertainty brought about by the return of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States. While his first term saw a significant deterioration in US-China relations, his China policy this time around remains yet unclear, and he has sent out contradictory signals. To name a few, his administration has imposed 10 per cent tariffs on all Chinese goods, and removed the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from a government factsheet. At the same time, Trump has spoken positively about his relationship with Xi Jinping and China, including in front of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He has also suggested that a trade deal with China is “possible”. Second, China’s export-driven economy continues to face headwinds, and access to the 1.4 billion strong Indian market as part of a normal India-China relationship may have played a role in the Chinese decision to disengage at the border. Lastly, Beijing may not want to ramp up tensions just yet, given the prospects of Modi’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit later this year. Modi has not visited China since 2018.

Finally, the statements coming out of India and China indicate that both countries are looking to construct a new modus vivendi for their relationship. Be it India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar talking about the search for a new “equilibrium” with China, or Xi Jinping talking about finding the “right and bright path for big, neighbouring countries to live in harmony” in his meeting with Modi in October 2024, the India-China relationship seems to be moving in this direction. Any military manoeuvres that risk upsetting this search for high-level stability will be counterproductive.

To be sure, the structural issues that plague the India-China relationship will fester until they are resolved or squared away as part of a broader détente. These include China’s view of India’s border infrastructure and India’s relationship with the United States as partially instigated by the US to contain China in Asia. Or, for that matter, India’s potential to threaten Chinese interests and hegemony in Asia. Beijing’s mistrust arising out of these misperceptions may still lead it to coerce India to attempt to keep it off-balance. The standoff is also not over yet, with de-escalation of the 100,000 troops yet to be achieved. In sum, the border will most likely see patrols and faceoffs in the summer. But large-scale attempts to change the status quo and violent clashes are far less certain, and in my view, less likely.

The writer is a senior research analyst at Carnegie India, and the author of Negotiating the India-China Standoff: 2020-2024