By Nayanika Majumdar
Last month, the intersection of art and generative AI (GenAI) was called into scrutiny again, when news of the release of Ambikapathy, the Tamil version of the movie Raanjhanaa, with an altered ending created using AI, flooded social media. The news elicited mixed reactions: The creators of the movie said the move cloaked the film’s legacy in a synthetic cape without consent, while the producers, Eros, hailed the new ending as a creative, lawful reinterpretation.
Eros claims that all rights, decisions, and creative control related to Raanjhanaa remain solely with it as the exclusive copyright holder. This statement implies that Eros, as the copyright holder, not only has commercial rights to the movie but can also dictate modifications to it post its release. Further, any alteration to the movie (AI-generated or not) would require Eros’ consent. This begets an important and urgent question that directors now face: Are they rightless against the inevitable disruptions caused by GenAI, and does copyright law have any solutions?
Section 2(d) of the Copyright Act 1957 defines who will be considered an “author” of a work, which, in the case of a cinematographic film, is the producer. Further, Section 57 provides for moral rights that allow for a creator of a work to require being credited for their work and object to any distortion or mutilation of the work. One may argue that a director can seek refuge under Section 57 against an alternate ending released without his consent. However, upon closer scrutiny, this seems difficult. The wording of Section 57 states that the right set out therein can be exercised by the “author” of a work. Reading Section 2(d) and 57 together implies that the producer not only has commercial rights but also moral rights to a film.
This position has been reiterated by courts. They have acknowledged that there are two sets of rights under Section 14 and Section 57. Section 14 gives the author a copyright, i.e., the exclusive right to certain acts, such as distribution, reproduction, adaptation, etc., in relation to a work. Section 57, on the other hand, provides for moral rights. However, it has been reaffirmed that moral rights under the law are tied to the concept of “author” set out under Section 2(d) (Sartaj Singh Pannu vs Gurbani Media Pvt Ltd & Anr 2015). Thus, it can be deduced that the director cannot assert moral rights in relation to a cinematographic film.
The discussion on the need to acknowledge directors as authors of a cinematographic film is not new. In fact, the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2010 proposed that the principal director of a film should also be recognised as an author and copyright owner under the Act. Further, it was proposed to categorise cinematographic films as works of joint authorship except in cases wherein the producer and the principal director were the same. However, despite acknowledging that the Act does not recognise a director’s creativity in spite of his intellectual contribution in the creation of a film, the Standing Committee Report on the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2010 rejected the proposed amendments.
The reasons for the same were three-pronged. First, the Committee stated that such an arrangement is not drawn out in most jurisdictions, and neither is it accommodated for in the treaties governing intellectual property rights. Second, it emphasised that the producer makes a monetary investment in the film and takes the risk of his investment not being recovered; thus, protection of the producer’s interest is paramount. Third, it raised objections to the term “principal director” not being defined and the challenges that can arise due to the same. The Committee also suggested that the directors can enter into agreements and negotiate the terms and conditions of the same. In light of such recommendations from the Committee, the then UPA government dropped the proposed amendments from the bill.
Therefore, the extant law continues to protect the investor over the director, the actual creator of a film. In the absence of contractually negotiated terms or co-authorship rights, the director has no remedy in a scenario wherein his movie and its messaging can be substantially altered. This calls for a reconsideration of the law as it stands currently to accommodate the challenges brought about by Gen AI. The courts and the lawmakers need to consider balancing commercial and moral rights and protect the rights of the creators, who currently stand rightless and will only be strong-armed by the investors.
The writer is an Assistant Professor at Jindal Global Law School