Opinion As Israel strikes Yemen, it will need to look back at its security architecture after conflict with Iran

Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, has emerged as a central flashpoint in this arch rivalry, which intensified following the mid-2002 revelation of Tehran’s nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. The policy trajectory has remained consistent across successive US administrations, culminating in direct military strikes against three important nuclear facilities inside Iran on June 22, 2025. These actions, however, followed Israel’s pre-emptive strikes against Iran on June 13 and subsequent Iranian retaliation.

While the military exchanges between Israel and Iran in 2024 resulted in limited material damage to both parties, it appeared that the former’s leadership had grown complacent due to the measured Iranian responses during these earlier strikes. Tel Aviv was operating under the assumption that future threats could be effectively mitigated through existing air defence systems, a miscalculation that proved costly. Critical infrastructure in Israel, including a Haifa oil refinery, a Beersheba hospital, and residential complexes in populated areas suffered substantial harm.

On the other hand, the conflict’s aftermath presents significant challenges for Iran’s domestic stability. The current regime confronts the imperative of securing substantial public support for its continued legitimacy while simultaneously implementing more stringent governance measures to prevent the fragmentation of public opinion. This represents a particularly delicate balancing act, given recent episodes of civil unrest (for instance, Mahsa Amini) stemming from Iran’s human rights records, restrictions on female political participation, and persistent socio-economic grievances. In the post-conflict environment, the theocratic regime is likely to respond to any manifestation of dissent with increased authoritarian measures. This “wounded” regime — even the IRGC has suffered severe operational degradation following the elimination of several senior military commanders — is likely going to be a dangerous one.

The conflict has also fundamentally challenged Iran’s regional ambitions, especially its project of establishing a Shiite crescent across the Levant. The assassination of former Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut in September 2024, to an extent, undermined operation effectiveness of the Axis of Resistance, calling into question the viability of Iran’s regional proxy network. The fall of former Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad to rebel forces in December 2024 constituted a major setback for Iranian leadership, representing the loss of a crucial ally who had been instrumental in sustaining and advancing the so-called resistance framework. And beyond the Houthis’ initial missile attack against Israel, other Iranian proxies had shown limited engagement during the conflict. This was mostly evident among Iranian-aligned groups operating out of Lebanon and Iraq which could be construed as potential weaknesses in Iran’s proxy coordination and commitment mechanisms. However, it remains premature to anticipate the complete cessation of proxy activities; these groups will likely adopt a more cautious operational posture to avoid retaliatory measures for a while.

Israel’s security challenge

While Iran’s setbacks during the June conflict were discernible, Israel also confronted significant security challenges. Despite deploying advanced anti-missile defence systems, including variants of Arrow, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and US-manufactured Patriot systems, which intercepted numerous long-range ballistic missiles, the defensive network proved insufficient against the sustained missile assault carried out by Iran. For a geographically constrained state like Israel, prolonged exposure to such intensive attacks from regional adversaries presents unsustainable strategic risks, given its limited defensive resources and the escalating financial cost of continuous retaliation.

Questions also remain regarding the sustainability of Israel’s dependence on American security assurances, particularly given the Trump administration’s disinterest to engage in protracted Middle Eastern military entanglements. This dilemma between immediate security guarantees and long-term strategic autonomy presents a critical consideration for Israeli defence planning moving forward.

The damage inflicted upon Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will likely require several years of reconstruction efforts, though whether Tehran will resume uranium enrichment activities remains an open question. Simultaneously, there are growing concerns that Iran may retreat into unprecedented levels of operational secrecy, potentially complicating international monitoring efforts and obscuring the regime’s actual capabilities and intentions from the global community.

Given Israel’s consistent capacity for strategic adaptation following military engagements throughout its history, it will likely conduct a comprehensive assessment of the operational deficiencies and strategic vulnerabilities exposed during the recent confrontation. The 12-day confrontation, nevertheless, marks a watershed moment, testing Israel and Iran’s deterrence frameworks and strategic resilience, fundamentally altering the parameters of their longstanding rivalry and establishing new precedents for regional security dynamics.

The writer is Deputy Director & Assistant Professor, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune