The recent events in southern Israel need no further description. As with most modern tragedies, live video online provided the world with a front-seat view of the horrors of that first day. Israel’s response once the initial impact of the strategic surprise had been overcome has been as expected. The country has united, and Israel’s special forces and front-line combat units have made quick work of the 1,500-odd Hamas militants who had managed to penetrate deep into Israel. IDF spokespersons have made it clear that their mandate now is to “annihilate” not only Hamas’ military capacity but also its “capacity to govern Gaza”’. They also reiterate the IDF’s commitment towards the ordinary civilians in Gaza, with whom Israel has no fight and who therefore will not themselves be targets.
This second objective, looking to destroy Hamas’ ability to govern the Gaza strip, is a shift in Israel’s immediate, explicit goals. What does it mean to say Hamas will no longer govern Gaza? Who will govern the two million people of that territory? Israel? Hamas has given Israel the choice between a bad war and an even worse peace.
For a number of important reasons, Israel’s paper military superiority will not mean a decisive conflict ending with a quick peace and the absence of Hamas. Consider that Gaza consists of a mere 139 square miles of land bounded by the ocean and a three-sided, closed border. Also consider that of the two million Gazans, over 5,00,000 are men of military age who have been fed a near-constant stream of anti-Semitic Israel-hate, while having null economic, social or cultural opportunities. All they have experienced of Israel or Israelis has been in their unique context. Consider finally that small arms, IEDs and even various forms of hand-held heavy weaponry are all probably easily accessible to this population.
War-gaming Israel’s options and the build-up of ground forces that is already occurring, a ground assault on Gaza is highly likely. The question that remains is what the final objectives and victory conditions of such an operation would be – and that is the terrain on which things get very complicated. Throughout the history of warfare, cities have been natural strongholds. Stalingrad in the Second World War saw Hitler’s divisions bleed themselves to death in endless, brutal, urban combat. More recently, operations against ISIS were the most daunting when Iraqi and American forces had to retake cities like Mosul, which may have been an instructive case. Unfortunately, Gaza isn’t Mosul.
By and large, the Iraqi civilians of Mosul hated ISIS, and cooperated with them only under extreme duress. These civilians also had multiple directions to try to escape the city at various points during the fighting as avenues of exit opened amidst the fluidity of the frontlines. Despite these conditions, Mosul was hell – being described as the ‘City of Death’ in a memoir written by one American veteran of that battle. Civilians suffered endlessly as collateral damage and their deliberate use by ISIS fighters to camouflage movements, hide, extract supplies and act as human shields was widespread.
Gaza is much worse. Due to its geographical position and highly constrained extent, Gaza is already a very densely populated urban area, with a population with no opportunity for escape when the fighting reaches the streets. This is also a population that largely supports or sympathises with the efforts of the military wing of Hamas – medical aid, rescue, supplies and ammunition, observation of Israeli movements – these are all critical support functions that the young children, women, the infirm and the old can perform during an Israeli ground operation. And Israel will face in direct combat not merely Hamas’ military wing, but up to five hundred thousand radicalized military-age males who are defending their homes from their greatest enemies. These will also be people who have recently suffered losses and devastation in the Israeli airstrikes of the last few days. Expect every street, every building, every square to be contested. Expect IEDs in every corner, suicide bombers, snipers, and booby traps. Expect gruelling urban combat with a civilian population motivated to help one side, hate the other and have no options for escape and everything to fight for.
Given the best army in the world, Gaza may still be an impossible place to occupy after the decades-long admixture of some of the world’s most volatile ingredients. A radicalized, poor, geographically constrained population with no good options but to fight is a recipe for a bloodbath. This implies that Israel cannot – in good conscience and without utter disregard for the civilians of Gaza – undertake a ground operation whose endgame is total occupation of the territory and future governance by Israel. Instead, expect devastation from the air and several weeks, even months, of active Israeli ground incursions deep into various parts of Gaza as targets of interest and importance are systematically reduced, at the end of which, the IDF will withdraw.
None of the above paints anything but an ultimate victory for the ideas and attitudes that Hamas represents. This attack’s true aim is simply to recommence another cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians and prevent peace overtures from gaining momentum. Hamas has no interest in peace between Israel and Palestine – their own relevance, the power of their false narratives, would be shattered. In maintaining a call for the destruction of Israel and its replacement by a single Palestinian state, Hamas’ true aim is to generate a forever-war. In this, they will undoubtedly have been successful, as another generation of Israelis and Palestinians learn the meaning of loss and hate. It is impossible to imagine a sustainable peace after whatever form of military operation Israel undertakes. The world, reeling already from the war in Ukraine, has become an even more dangerous place.
Shah is an alumnus of London School of Economics, Cambridge and Harvard, and lives and works in Mumbai.