Opinion India has stakes in Gaza’s peace

There are both historical precedents and regional interests for New Delhi to be actively involved in the new plan

Indian participation would stand in contrast to China’s critical stance towards Trump’s proposal.

October 10, 2025 08:38 AM IST First published on: Oct 10, 2025 at 07:11 AM IST

On Thursday, Israel and Hamas agreed to the initial phase of a ceasefire proposal in Gaza based on US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, including an immediate ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal to agreed lines, and the release of all hostages in exchange for the release of Palestinian detainees. Hamas would be excluded from governance and a demilitarisation process initiated. The plan calls for international investment in water, energy, health, infrastructure, and economic development.

Trump’s plan has won cautious backing from various key actors such as the Palestinian Authority (PA), the EU, and Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, despite concerns about the lack of a clear timeline for Israel’s withdrawal. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also reluctantly supported the plan even though some right-wing members of his coalition have criticised it. They are firmly opposed to granting Palestinians any role in governance. Although Hamas has indicated a willingness to engage in talks, it has also expressed reservations about the requirement for disarmament.

India has welcomed the plan with PM Narendra Modi, too, describing it as “decisive progress” and a “significant step forward”. Israel’s envoy to India said that it should carry out reconstruction activities, given its expertise in important infrastructural projects and its good relations with both Israel and the PA.

However, since October 7, 2023, India’s official position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been cautious, oscillating between condemnation of terrorism and a desire to preserve strategic interests with Israel, while maintaining a principled stance in favour of Palestine. This is consistent with its historical commitments, notably its longstanding position that the only durable peace is one that allows for an independent Palestine and ensures Israel’s security.

Despite India’s ambiguous signalling, there are some reasons to believe that it may be asked to play a more important role. For one, it has historically been engaged in supporting a resolution to the conflict. In 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru lobbied for India to become a member of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, where it went against Western states to support the creation of a single federal state with Arab and Jewish provinces. India did recognise the State of Israel in 1950, but maintained its solidarity with the Palestinian cause, notably through sustained financial support since 1951 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

India also contributed major contingents to both UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I) and UNEF II — peacekeeping operations deployed during and after Arab-Israeli conflicts. Patrolling the Egypt-Israel Sinai border, Indian forces even endured casualties in the early hours of the Six-Day War in May 1967.

Even as France, the UK, Canada and Australia decided to recognise the Palestinian state, India has highlighted that it was one of the first non-Arab states to do so, in 1988. The establishment of India’s diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992 was partly driven by concerns of being excluded from an ongoing peace process that had begun with the Madrid Peace conference. Since then, New Delhi has regularly attended donor conferences and UN committee meetings on Palestinian rights, and provided developmental aid and technical assistance and training to the PA while developing strategic ties with Israel.

India has criticised Israel’s ongoing military operations, even if not always directly, especially following its strike on Doha. India’s shifting stance is a reaction to the change in international opinion on Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ concerns about the Qatar attack. India also has interests in the region that go beyond strategic exchanges with Israel on counterterrorism. Over the past decade, India’s economic and political relations with the GCC states have changed dramatically, especially following the Abraham Accords and the announcement of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) project in 2023. Given growing economic interdependence, India will likely align its positions with those of the GCC.

There are historical precedents and regional interests for India to be actively involved in the new Gaza plan. Indian participation would also stand in contrast to China’s critical stance towards Trump’s proposal. Given the unanswered questions with respect to the plan’s implementation, India would need to carefully condition any type of participation on the historical principles guiding its position: Ensuring Palestinian sovereignty, offering protection guarantees and humanitarian relief to Palestinians staying in Gaza, and respect for international humanitarian laws.

One immediate discussion should be over whether Indian workers would be encouraged to participate in reconstruction projects. Close to 12,000 Indians came to Israel, through government-to-government agreements and private recruitment channels, to replace Palestinian workers. India would need to ensure that such recruitment efforts do not alter the economic landscape in ways that could make Israel-Palestine reconciliation harder, as it reduces avenues of Palestinian engagement with Israel and may add to existing Palestinian grievances.

Blarel is assistant professor of International Relations at Leiden University, the Netherlands. Ganguly is a senior fellow and directs the Huntington Programme on strengthening US-India relations at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University