Opinion The hidden costs of Trump’s tariffs on India’s knowledge economy

Tariffs on such products, or on key components used in their manufacture, do not operate in a vacuum. They often translate into elevated costs, procurement delays, and sometimes, an inability to execute research plans as designed. These constraints are compounded by evolving export control frameworks, particularly those governing dual-use technologies, which require elaborate end-use certifications, extended approval timelines, and closer scrutiny, even for academic or non-commercial research.

This confluence of policy instruments can inadvertently create a form of technological distance, one that resembles traditional sanctions not in intent, but in effect. When researchers report delays of several months in receiving critical equipment, or when procurement costs exceed project budgets due to shifting trade terms, the result is not merely logistical, it is systemic. In time-sensitive research areas, such delays can affect project viability, student training, and international collaborations.

Such concerns are especially pertinent in the current geopolitical context. India’s own shift in import policy following the Galwan Valley incident in 2020 — aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese suppliers — has already constrained access to several categories of mid-range scientific equipment. For years, Chinese manufacturers provided cost-effective solutions for centrifuges, microscopes, thermal cyclers, and balances — equipment that forms the core infrastructure of thousands of laboratories across India. Their sudden absence has compelled researchers to turn to Western alternatives, often at significantly higher prices and with longer delivery lead times.

What emerges, therefore, is a dual-layered constraint: Access to advanced, high-end instrumentation faces regulatory and fiscal hurdles abroad, while access to mid-tier, affordable instruments is restricted by policy at home. The net effect is a narrowing of options for Indian scientists and a rising cost of doing science, particularly for institutions with modest funding.

The issue is not without precedent. Following India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998, the scientific community faced formal technology embargoes, particularly in aerospace and computing. The denial of cryogenic engines, satellite components, and supercomputers delayed several national programmes. While these challenges catalysed indigenous innovation in some areas, the overall progress was uneven and often prolonged. More recently, during the Covid pandemic, even as India emerged as a leading vaccine producer, it encountered difficulties in sourcing essential components such as bioprocess bags, sterile filters, and borosilicate glass vials, many of which were subject to temporary export controls in Europe and the US.

These episodes illustrate a recurring theme: When science becomes entangled in trade and geopolitical dynamics, the cost is borne not only by institutions but by the broader knowledge economy. India’s ambition to become a global knowledge hub by 2047 necessitates the uninterrupted availability of scientific tools and infrastructure. For this, several policy responses merit consideration.

First, science and technology inputs should be recognised as critical infrastructure in trade negotiations, and explicitly addressed within the frameworks of bilateral and multilateral agreements. Their importance to national development justifies a degree of insulation from general-purpose tariffs or trade retaliation mechanisms.

Second, India’s domestic import procedures for research-related equipment should be streamlined. Delays at customs, especially for time-sensitive biological or electronic materials, remain a persistent concern. Dedicated fast-track mechanisms for accredited research institutions may offer a viable solution.

Third, India should continue investing in domestic capabilities for the manufacture of scientific instrumentation. Rather than replicating all high-end technologies, a phased approach involving joint ventures, public–private partnerships, and strategic technology transfers could enhance resilience over time.

Finally, India may consider advocating, at appropriate global fora such as the WTO and UNESCO, for the recognition of scientific instruments as global public goods. Just as essential medicines and humanitarian supplies are treated with special consideration during global crises, so too should key scientific tools be afforded protection from restrictive trade practices.

Scientific research is a foundational component of national progress, underpinning health, education, security, and economic development. It flourishes in environments marked by openness, collaboration, and timely access to tools. In designing trade policies for a multipolar world, it is imperative that such long-term public interests are kept in view. Ensuring that the pathways to scientific advancement remain open is not just a matter of policy alignment, it is a question of vision.

The writer is former director, Agharkar Research Institute, Pune, and visiting professor, IIT Bombay