Opinion Former ambassador to Turkey Sanjay Bhattacharyya writes: Election shows a deeply divided electorate, but Erdogan’s charisma endures

Erdogan’s Islamist-nationalist People’s Alliance, led by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Kilicdaroglu’s opposition Nation Alliance, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) presented the 64 million electorate with vastly differing visions for Turkey’s democracy, economic trajectory, social fabric and foreign policy.

Erdogan is a colossus in Turkish politics – first as Prime Minister and then as President. He has not lost an election in two decades. His popularity was always more than that of the AK Party. Erdogan’s focus on development in his initial years in office won him support from people in the hinterland. He also cultivated new elites. His aggressive stance on foreign policy and hardline nationalism has won him many admirers. However, Erdogan’s unorthodox economic ideology led to an economic slowdown, skyrocketing inflation and depreciation of the Turkish lira in recent years. The handling of the terrible Kahramanmaras earthquake, in which over 50,000 people lost their lives, seems to have dented his popularity.

Kilicdaroglu was a study in contrast. He was a soft-spoken former bureaucrat with a reputation for taking a tough stance on corruption. During his decade-long leadership of CHP, he was unable to unseat Erdogan and the formidable AK Party. ln the municipal elections of 2019, the CHP captured key towns, including Istanbul and Ankara. In 2021, six opposition parties agreed to a common mandate, but it was only on the eve of the elections that Kilicdaroglu was accepted as the joint opposition candidate. His popularity with diverse social groups and the ability to strike a balance between different ideologies stood him in good stead.

Two other candidates joined the fray, Muharrem Ince of the Homeland Party, who pledged support to Kilicdaroglu and later withdrew, and Sinan Ogan of Ancestral Alliance, earlier a supporter of Erdogan.

CHP recognised the necessity of a unified candidate against the formidable Erdogan. Its focus was on alliance building. The authoritarianism versus democracy cleavage brought together divergent opposition parties. Kilicdaroglu accepted the demand of the influential nationalist Good Party (IYI) to include the popular mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, both from CHP, as the vice presidential candidates, thereby widening support from women, youth and the Kemalists. He also obtained the support of former AK Party leaders such as Ahmed Davutoglu and Ali Babacan, religious parties and even Kurdish groups.

The CHP campaign strategy avoided direct confrontation with Erdogan and the popular values he represented. Instead, it appealed to all segments of Turkish society and promised financial redistribution to disadvantaged groups. Issues such as foreign policy or religious sentiments were not emphasised. Kilicdaroglu promised to bring change, primarily to give freedom to citizens and improve the economy through orthodox policies. He also stood for secular politics and stronger partnerships with Europe and USA.

The AK Party had a different strategy. It promoted institutions based on majoritarianism and centralisation of power. The executive presidential model, introduced in 2017, gave decree powers to the president while diluting the role of parliament. Erdogan’s campaign focused on building a strong Turkey that would be independent with influence across a wider region. On the economy, he reiterated the significance of low-interest rates to promote investment and employment. He also espoused a strong defence sector. He promised a hardline stand on terrorist groups and warned that the Opposition was soft on separatists.

A generation of young Turks have grown up in the shadow of Erdogan, initially benefiting from economic growth and his moderate approach on religious matters. Later they experienced economic crisis, nationalism and religious conservatism. While the Turkish youth are, by and large, nationalist, they have little interest in projects to revive the glory of the Ottoman Empire or assume the leadership of the Muslim world. They are more concerned by the slide in the economy and hope for Western investments and better economic opportunities.

Turkey, as an economic power located in a geo-strategic hotspot, a member of NATO and a candidate for European Union membership, had a relationship of mutual dependence with the West. Turkey also had close links with Russia. Erdogan’s aggressive foreign policy agenda, including the security belt in Syria, strikes against Kurds in Iraq, threats of opening the gates for Syrian refugees to enter the EU, military support to Azerbaijan and Libya and its claims in the Eastern Mediterranean has posed new challenges. The West has found it difficult to manage the unpredictability of Turkey. Punitive measures such as cutting off Turkey from the F-35 jet project and sanctions for S-400 missile purchases or the setting up of a nuclear power plant by Russia could not change the situation. However, Turkey’s recent overtures to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East and the opportunities for economic cooperation with the West may open new windows for constructive engagement.

As major economies, India and Turkey have the potential to expand cooperation. Since the 1950s, Turkey has preferred to look at bilateral ties through the prism of Pakistan – especially the latter’s views on Kashmir. This tendency seems to have grown in recent times. At the same time, India and Turkey collaborated in the fight against Covid and New Delhi provided humanitarian assistance to Ankara during last year’s earthquake. Recently, there have been meetings at high levels and both countries are G-20 partners. Patient diplomacy can open up possibilities.

The writer is former Ambassador to Turkey