Opinion Anti-defection law and Supreme Court’s order for Telangana speaker: When the custodian refuses to act

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Padi Kaushik Reddy v. State of Telangana (2025) exemplifies this challenge. The case came up after three Bharat Rashtra Samithi MLAs defected to the ruling Congress in 2024. Petitions seeking their disqualification were filed before the Speaker of the Telangana Assembly, who kept them pending, allegedly for political reasons. A single judge bench of the High Court directed the Assembly Secretary to place the petitions before the Speaker and ensure a hearing schedule. Disagreeing, the division bench quashed the order, holding — contrary to the prevailing Indian jurisprudence — that courts cannot fix timelines for the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, significant time had passed.

Apprehensions foreseen in 1985

This very fear of delay was foreseen during the parliamentary debates of 1985. Parliament chose to vest decision-making power in the Speaker, not the Courts or the Election Commission, to ensure the swift disposal of petitions. The worry was that judicial procedures would consume time and deny rightful representation to the electorate.

Yet, no statutory limits were set on the Speaker’s discretion, perhaps because the law’s immediate purpose — when it was introduced — was to prevent the elected members of the Congress party from defecting to the opposition, a pattern that gave a blow to Congress in several states. Even so, Congress leader Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi had cautioned: “Now, in regard to a dispute regarding a member, the matter will be referred to the Presiding Officer, but no time limit has been fixed. I would request that in the next session, the time limit be fixed within which the Speaker has to announce his decision. If he keeps it pending for three to four months, it should not be allowed.” His words now seem to be prophetic. Across the country, Speakers have used inaction to shield defectors, hollowing out the law itself.

The Supreme Court’s analysis in Padi Kaushik

In Padi Kaushik Reddy, the SC revisited its precedents. Referring to Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), it reiterated that while the Speaker’s procedural role and actions are immune from judicial review under Articles 122 and 212 of the Constitution, decisions on disqualification petitions are judicial in nature and subject to review on limited grounds such as mala fides, perversity, or jurisdictional error.

Relying on Rajendra Singh Rana & Ors v. Swami Prasad Maurya & Ors (2007), the Court stressed that failure to exercise jurisdiction cannot excuse inaction. In the above-mentioned case, given excessive delay and the impending dissolution of the Assembly, the Court directly decided disqualification without remanding the matter back to the Speaker. Similarly, in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020), the Court had imposed a four-week limit for deciding petitions, recognising that delay itself defeats the law. The Court also observed that Speakers should normally conclude matters within three months.

Against this backdrop, paragraphs 93 to 95 of the Padi Kaushik judgment are telling. The Court reaffirmed that while it cannot mechanically dictate timelines, indefinite silence renders the Tenth Schedule meaningless. The Speaker is under a constitutional duty to act within a reasonable time. Where this duty is breached, judicial review may not prescribe rigid deadlines but can intervene to ensure that the law’s very purpose of curbing defections is not frustrated.

A law to ensure enforcement

The judgment lays bare the core dilemma. The Tenth Schedule vests power in the Speaker on the assumption that constitutional morality will guide him. But as the 1985 debates and repeated judicial interventions reveal, this assumption has not held. The Speaker’s inaction, warned against four decades ago by parliamentarians like Dasmunsi, remains the law’s Achilles’ heel.

The Supreme Court has once again underlined the problem, while exercising restraint so as not to encroach upon the legislature’s domain. Unless parliament amends the law to fix a clear timeline or shifts adjudication to an independent authority, the anti-defection regime will continue to be hollowed out by seemingly partisan Speakers.

The “evil of political defections” that the framers sought to eradicate thus survives — not because the law is absent, but because its custodian refuses to act.

The writers teach law at Jindal Global Law School