‘You have to give a direction. It may turn out to be wrong. That chance you have to take as a leader’

• …Arafat was in town. And there are those who say that you made sure he was going to land on that day.

I informed him even before the file went out of my office. His first reaction was, ‘Very good, at least we have a common friend’.

• So that was a masterstroke, to have Yasser Arafat endorse it on the same day.

A masterstroke or a coincidence. I don’t know.

• Nobody believes it was a coincidence.

Well… It’s up to you.

• So what prompted that decision?

Because I found that under resolution 242 and all those things… there was too much of wrangling that didn’t quite make sense. There was a time when Mr (George) Schultz or someone from America came, and Romesh Bhandari, myself and that gentleman were chatting in my office in South Block. You won’t believe it… the conversation was converging on a solution. Being a very intelligent person…

• (Solution) of the Palestinian issue?

… He didn’t quite seem to stop it. But he tapered it off, and said you can work on it, let’s see. So if you really go into the matter without prejudices or taking sides, there is hardly anything human ingenuity cannot solve.

• Opening up to Israel has been one of the great gains for us. It is a very fruitful relationship. And yet we were scared of saying so, I think we indulged in a lot of hypocrisy on the Israel issue.

No, it was not hypocrisy. Again don’t get me wrong and don’t jump to the other extreme. There are circumstances when you have a public policy, that public policy need not necessarily be 100 per cent in line with what you think in your heart of hearts. You only think this is not the time to tell people of what I really think… You have to choose the moment, wait for it.

• Lots of things happened in that year-and-a-half. Opening up to Israel, opening up to South Africa and the changes in the Soviet Union.

South Africa was obvious because there was a change there.

• And the dismantling of the Soviet bloc?

Dismantling of the Soviet bloc we had nothing to do with. They did it.

• But did that come as a surprise? It made you move very rapidly.

If you ask me to tell you the truth, a number of people, including myself, saw it coming. You don’t wait for something to come and fall on you. You develop a certain hunch. And with those hunches I saw it coming.

Although some of my party people took me to task when I said something about the coming events in a meeting in Talkatora Stadium (New Delhi). I was almost condemned. It so happened it came true within a month.

I could not possibly gather them again and say what do you have to say. That is not done.

• If you had started doing that, you would have had to do it once a week.

That’s right. You see you are at the helm and you have to steer clear of crocodiles. How you do it is something which you can never learn.

• Was that a great foreign policy challenge, steering India’s interests at a time when the Cold War was ending? When the world was becoming unipolar?

Yes, it was a new situation.

• And our friend was collapsing.

But we weren’t the only country facing it. The whole world was facing it. It was an international situation. That helps.

• It was less complicated for those who were more inclined on the other side, the American side.

That is true. I told you in the beginning that bringing it from minus to one has its own hazards. If it had not succeeded, horrendous things would have happened to this country.

• When a near-coup replaced Gorbachev, you said this is what happens to reformers in a hurry.

I might have said something to that effect…

• It sounded like a statement made in a hurry.

It wasn’t made in a hurry. But I could see it a little more strongly than the others. So I blurted out something which perhaps wasn’t proper at that particular moment.

But then ultimately you have to give a direction. You have to indicate a direction which you believe is the right direction. It may turn out to be wrong for extraneous causes… That much chance you have to take if you are a leader.

• Tell me of your experience in dealing with (Bill) Clinton. You dealt with him in his first presidency.

My visit took place in his first term. I did request him to visit India but in his first term that wasn’t possible. So Mrs Clinton came here. I think we were quite happy with the visit. And I believe she was also happy. After that…

• But you found him change from his first term to second term towards India. His agenda was much less of a proliferation agenda and much more of an engagement agenda.

With India, he cannot talk about a subject which is not common to both of us. If it is the economic aspect we are exploring, he can’t possibly drag us into some other direction.

• But in the first term it was much more on proliferation.

Because we were not quite ready with our own brief for the economic agenda. As I said, our credibility was low at the time. And if it was low in America too, I wouldn’t be surprised.

• The credibility of economic reforms?

Being sincere about the reforms.

• So once they realised we were firm on the path of economic reforms, they began engaging with us in other areas, not just proliferation?

Quite right.

• Mr Rao, will you tell me how intense was the pressure on you at that time? Kashmir erupting; crises in Babri Masjid, Charar-e-Sharief; pressure on human rights and proliferation.

The pressure on human rights is very interesting. We used to get a missive every day or every three days from Amnesty International. The answer to that was we had our own human rights commission. And after that Amnesty International just forgot about India.

• But the pressure from America? Pressure on proliferation? Don’t test, don’t test?

They have been saying it since Panditji’s time and what is new about it. We didn’t quite oblige, that’s also not new.

• But that is also something on which history has raised a question mark, and let’s not wait for your book. Is it true that we came close to testing but did not under American pressure?

This is something I have answered several times. This secret will perish along with me. It will never come out of my mouth. Lots of books have been written — all off the mark. Some were written less off, some very much off.

• So you mean the secret, as in what exactly happened during those two months…

You take a decision, you don’t take it in the air. And those characteristics which led to that decision are very important in statecraft. You don’t go about bragging about them or publicising them. I am a believer in confidentiality in politics at a particular level.

• Because that’s a claim Strobe Talbott has just made, in fact, in an interview with me. That American satellites and intelligence picked up evidence of an impending test. And then Clinton called.

What happened in 1998? There was a blackout?

• He said this time we could not pick it up.

Also Pakistan?

• But that you knew was going to happen.

Their blindness was at least impartial.

• It’s called bipartisan. But he (Talbott) clearly said Clinton called you and when you went to Washington, he came to see you and gave you evidence.

Nobody need give me evidence, I have the evidence myself… It doesn’t make one iota of difference to me whether what I am doing is known to somebody else or not. And I am not so naive as to think you can do these things with perfect confidentiality.

• Let me give you the other interpretation. You can laugh again and we will interpret your laughter or your smile like people did with Deng Xiaoping. The other interpretation is you strung the Americans along until we were actually ready to test at the level that you wanted to test, and a paki pakayee, cooked-up meal, you left for your successor.

All this is journalistic imagination, approximation. Call it what you will. But it’s a very legitimate activity.

If Raj Chengappa has written a book on this, I congratulate him. He has tried very hard to come close to the truth. He didn’t succeed, that’s a different matter. But he tried several sources, he tried to compare this with the other. Check back, check forward, check in all directions, like a good author should. To that extent, I give him full marks.

• And to Strobe Talbott?

I really don’t know much about him. I have met him only once…

• And was that when he came to see you in Washington?

I don’t know, I don’t remember. My comment on this would be very…

• So when will be the right time for history to know what exactly happened?

No. They will never know.

• They will never know? Not from you?

It’s from me. It will not be from someone (else). You can go on approximating.

• But why must you not make it part of the record of history? Lots of time has gone by now.

I am under oath. An oath for me is something very sacred. Not like Cabinet papers being circulated in advance.

• They are being rented out, as is sometimes the case. A final word on a couple of things, and this is prescriptive. Don’t shy away from them. One, what is your prescription for the Congress? The party is not doing very well, whatever the polls might say. There were some things that Lord Meghnad Desai wrote in my paper, on how the Congress could rediscover itself or re-invent itself like the Labour Party.

I think the Congress had been out of power for 60 years before winning a great struggle. So not being in power is nothing new to the party. And if you are suggesting that, you are only misleading the Congress.

Personally, I attach least importance to coming into power, being in power. The question is what you do for the country. The first resolution on non-alignment came from the then Congress Working Committee in 1946, one-and-a-half years before Independence.

• So what you are saying is you can build an agenda while you are not in power.

That is exactly what you do.

• So how should the Congress re-invent itself?

Take, for instance, a project. In the rainy season, when you can’t go out, you do the planning. You don’t keep quiet. Once October comes, then you start off at the field level.

• The sowing operations.

In every activity in human life.

• So this is one long monsoon?

It could be. A long monsoon is nothing to be ashamed of.

• But do you think the Congress should re-invent itself as Labour has done in Britain. Labour was also down in the dumps and you have read that article by Meghnad Desai.

You see, it is very hazy for a historian. Somebody, some English author, has said that when something happens the historian tells you why it happened; and when something he has predicted has not happened, he’ll tell you why it could not have happened. This is hindsight.

• So your prescription for the Congress is don’t be depressed by the fact that you are not in power. Treat it like a long monsoon and plan.

Absolutely. That’s it.

• But also modernise.

Of course. Why not? The Congress today is not what it was in 1946.

• But the BJP has modernised itself. It has younger leaders, a different agenda. It has set aside many of the contentious issues on its agenda. It’s moving closer to the middle ground.

Yeah. Then the rath yatra…

• The other question on which I want a prescription is India’s place in the world. Are you in agreement with the way this government has moved with Pakistan and America in the past four years? Is that the direction to go?

Panditji made it very clear that India is not really trying or asking for the leadership role. India is really about to play or has been playing an integrating role. I think India will continue to play the same role.

Take the Non-Aligned Movement. India never wanted to be the chairman of the movement, it could have been several times over if it wanted. But it came and fell in our lap (in 1983) because of the Iran-Iraq trouble. The turn was Iraq’s, Iran objected. Finally (they asked), can you do all the arrangements — ask Natwar Singh, he’ll tell you — within four months. We did that…

• You were the foreign minister.

Yes, I was the foreign minister at that time.

• On Pakistan, do you feel that this peace process will be more long lasting than the ones in the past? You tried a couple of times and it didn’t work. This time the army is actually in power, there is nobody to sabotage it. I am asking you as a statesman, I am not asking you as a partisan.

It’s very difficult for me, sitting in Delhi, even to hazard a guess on what happens on Pakistan’s side. So far as India is concerned, not for any moment did we not have a desire for good relations with Pakistan… Go deep into all the facts, apply your mind impartially. This is the irresistible conclusion you will come to.

• But the initiative Mr Vajpayee has taken, the kind of political commitment he has put behind it, are you in agreement? I am again asking you as a statesman, please for a moment forget the Congressman’s stand.

Everybody will be in agreement with any effort made by India to bring close relations between India and Pakistan. Are there any two opinions?

• But for a BJP leader to do so?

It doesn’t matter which leader. In a way, they have an advantage. They have no one to oppose it. When we did it, they were opposing it.

• Mr Advani said the other day something that people like us were writing as analysts. But for him to say it from his vantage position as a senior politician — that a better India-Pakistan relationship is essential for a better Hindu-Muslim relationship in India. What do you make of that?

I don’t know. It’s not a necessary corollary but logically, yes. There is no contradiction between the two. But the two are not identical.

• So you could have better relations with Pakistan, yet prejudices at home could persist if you don’t address them?

What about Hindus? What about Christians? What about the Indian situation within? Are they not part of the internal situation of India?

• Mr Rao, you said at one point that in 1991 you were not looking at 2004, you were looking at 2010. Now in 2004, when you have had time to think, reflect, where do you see India in 2010? Irrespective of who comes to power.

Well, I find that 2010 is not very far from 2004. It is much closer to what it was in 1991. It is obvious to me, I have every evidence to believe…

• …To believe India is on the right path?

Absolutely.

• Where do you see India in 2010? Do you see a middle-developed country? Do you see an India without problems in its neighbourhood?

This categorisation is something which baffles me. What is middle-class in one country is lower-class in another country.

• But you are optimistic?

I am absolutely optimistic. A 5,000-year-old civilisation cannot just go thanks to the follies or mistakes of one generation. No generation is that powerful as to destroy India.

• But the wisdom of a generation can take it forward.

Yes, certainly.

• You find today’s generation…

There is wisdom flowing like a river and the river has its own crocodiles, own ups and downs… This country has to be philosophical, has to be looking far into the future. You just cannot say what happened yesterday is this and therefore I don’t want to look at it.

• That’s why we want leaders like you, with your experience, joining at least the political discourse if not the political mainstream. Because you bring so much philosophy, knowledge, wisdom, experience…

I bring solace…

•.Solace, very important.

And nothing is so important to a country of this size and complexity than solace. It renews hope.

(Concluded)

PART I

PART II