Year after Kargil, Army still grapples for right reflexes

Sources in the armed forces say that unlike many other professional armies such as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army that has a clearly laid-out strategic policy, the Ministry of Defence simply has a letter from the Defence Minister dating back to 1987 that forms the mantra for the Indian armed forces.

There is also a growing feeling that a “reactive defence policy” being followed by the Indian Army poses a military disadvantage and the country should adopt an offensive defence policy.

There has also been some resentment about the Army performing the role of an internal watchman, with the armed forces being deployed for all counter insurgency duties. According to the top brass of the armed forces, there is a need for a greater role for central para-military forces in these tasks Besides, this would enable the armed forced to concentrate more on external security.

The top brass still feels that the most potent threat to India is from Pakistan. It feels that Pakistan has succeeded in countering India’s conventional advantage by going in for nuclear weaponisation, which is going on at a much faster rate than India.

It is also of the view that there has been a political nexus with the militants in Kashmir. They feel that there is considerable threat from the low intensity conflict being waged by Pakistan and this may spark a full-fledged war at some time.

What is significant is that Army also admits that it can do little to stop complete infiltration from across the border due to geographical constraints, as in many places the international border cuts through villages.

On the other flank in the North, it does not foresee an imminent threat from China. However, it admits that its surveillance capability over Tibet was very weak.

Sources in the defence forces point out that the top brass of the armed forces have apprised the government in their notes about the `terminal illness that the army’s modernisation plan were facing, but there is little that has changed at the cost of defence preparedness.

They indicate that there has to be greater cohesion between the political establishment and the armed forces. Citing the example of the Lahore Declaration of 1999, sources say while the Army wanted a clear inclusion of stopping all forms of terrorism in the draft but what was incorporated by the government at the end, was merely a mention of non interference in each other’s internal affairs.

There is also a dominant view that the reports by the Kargil Review Committee and the Committee on Defence Expenditure should be implemented by the government at the earliest and it should review its intelligence mechanism to prevent any such occurrence in the future.