Who really profits?

The absurdity of checks and balances placed on legislators is evident from the next steps being discussed in the Jaya Bachchan case. In the moments after she was officially disqualified as a member of Rajya Sabha, her Samajwadi Party was already talking of renominating her once bye-polls are announced. When by a stroke of the legislature8217;s vote an office of profit can be put on list of posts exempted from the disqualification guidelines, the disqualification can appear less of a case of grave conflict of interest 8212; and more an instance of bureaucratic oversight in not recommending yet another enlargement of the list of exemptions under the Parliament Prevention of Disqualification Act. When a law is so amenable to blithe tweaking, its viability as an instrument in separation of powers has to be in doubt.

At the heart of the ambiguity 8212; that makes charges of holding office of profit so easy to level against MPs and MLAs and that, curiously, allows so many offices to be summarily placed beyond the purview of disqualification 8212; is the silence on what exactly is an office of profit. The Constitution does not define it. Neither does any legislation. Bachchan has taken the issue to court, and there is a consensus being built that it be the court8217;s burden to make the definition. In doing so, Parliament would simply be passing the buck. Separation of powers and checks on conflicts of interest are aimed at guarding the independence of Parliament. It must take a proactive lead in determining how that independence can be preserved.

The larger assignment before Parliament is to examine what constitutes conflict of interest. Of late, reminders for this task have been coming in the guise of scandal. The cash-for-questions sting operation revealed the need to update guidelines on lobbying. Revelations on discrepancies in the MPLADS scheme point to the immense power of patronage being given to legislators, and the distortions it can wreak. On these and the office of profit issue, Parliament is being self-destructively reactive, restricting itself to expulsions and case-by-case resolution. Before the office of profit case fragments into quibbling over sub-clauses, Parliament must assert its supremacy by taking up a comprehensive bipartisan revision of instruments that are in place to maintain that very primacy.