
DECEMBER 31: quot;The world is asking a dreadful question that is more talked about in private conversation than discussed in print and on the air. It is for how long a nation places human life, including the lives of its own people, ahead of the national interest and the national repute?
The captors have done this country a hell of a favour8230;in prodding the country into a renaissance of national pride and unity we feared had evaporated.quot;
Some more unsolicited advice from a nation suddenly brimming with strategic and foreign affairs expertise after the hijacking of flight IC-814? Just another declaration of solidarity from bleary-eyed citizens compulsively switching channels for the very latest on the Kandahar standoff? No. Merely a sampling of the frenzied collective soul-searching the mainstream American press indulged in during another hostage crisis 8212; the 444-day captivity of American embassy staff in Tehran 20 years ago.
With India entering the seventh day of its first quot;live on televisionquot;airport vigil, it is getting a taste of dealing with crises in real time. If this results in viewers sitting in front of their TV sets through long hours of quietude, yet perpetually quivering with the expectation that something is about to happen, it also presents leaders with the dilemma of planning strategic response without being swayed by instantly formed, yet wildly fluctuating, public opinion.
And as Lloyd DeMause, Director of New York8217;s Insitute of Psychohistory, New York, illustrates in Reagan8217;s America, sizing up public sentiment as a lodestar is an exercise marked by peril. It was a lesson Jimmy Carter, whose ascent to presidency was supposed to be imbued with a resoluteness to put behind the Nixon years, learnt the hard way.
As the US economy took a turn for the better in the early Carter years, a quot;free floating anxietyquot; that the good times could not last was projected onto the peanut farmer, who in turn tried to rally his country by appealing to patriotism, by calling for 8220;a littlesacrifice from everyone8221; which would lead to the 8220;rebirth of the American spirit8221;.
But how was this sacrifice to be engineered? Writes deMause: 8220;In June 1979, Newsweek had reported that a White House advisor had told them that Zbigniew Brzezinski had said a quot;small warquot; might be useful to prove the President8217;s toughness. Obviously, if Iran grabbed American hostages, this might lead to a quot;small warquot; which would restore Carter8217;s failing potency and divert the country8217;s rage onto an quot;enemyquot; abroad.
Though no one said it aloud, the unconscious shared fantasy grew that American embassy personnel would have to be designated as the sacrificial victims. The only problem was to find a way to get Iran to act, and soon.
React Iran did on November 4 by taking 66 American embassy staff hostage in Tehran when the US allowed the exiled Shah to undergo medical treatment on its soil. The sale of Iranian flags in the US multiplied as the country rallied around him in a collective orgy of flag-burning,indignation and counselling. A hostage8217;s wife just had to tie a yellow ribbon around a tree and the country bonded anew to the strains of quot;Tie a yellow ribbon round the ole oak treequot;.
Predictably, Carter8217;s approval ratings soared, as did he on the wings of this sudden national endorsement. He clearly appreciated the diplomatic route to resolve the crisis, but deMause claims Americans were itching for a display of determined action 8212; quot;the sacrifice had to be played outquot;. Aware that military action would put a majority of hostage lives in danger, Carter at first refused to carry out the sacrifice but gave in soon enough after Washington Post found that a majority favoured military action even if it meant the hostages8217; death.
On April 25, Operation Eagle Claim began as eight helicopters took off from an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea on a 600-mile journey to Desert One where they were to be joined by six transport aircraft. Only to fall like nine pins. One developed rotor blade trouble,another8217;s pilot was blinded in a sandstorm. At Desert One, another helicopter was struck with hydraulic failure, signalling a botched up operation as at least six helicopters were critical for the rescue.
The unaccounted for sandstorm raged on, and as the refueling began for the return journey, three more were stranded, with one colliding with a transport plane, killing eight servicemen. Their colleagues promptly scampered away, leaving behind equipment and top-secret mission plans.
It was not quite the sacrifice Carter had in mind when he precipitated the hostage crisis to mould public opinion his favour, public opinion which eventually set him on the path to disaster.