What China could bring to SAARC

China’s membership to the SAARC cannot be treated perfunctorily since there is a genuine need for India to engage China due to reasons of geography alone. Indian policy makers need to examine the proposal minutely.

India is China’s largest trading partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade heading towards US$10 billion a year, with the balance in India’s favour. Nevertheless, if a few critical items like Indian export of iron ore and value added steel products, import of silk, etc. are taken out, there is little left in trade. China’s construction boom has created a high demand for steel, cement and aluminum products. Once this activity cools down, as is beginning to happen with new macro economic controls, trade figures will fall flat leaving India’s steel industry gasping.

Pakistan is China’s second largest trading partner in South Asia, but bilateral trade is struggling to reach even US$2 billion. China’s trade with other countries of South Asia is even more dismal.

China aims to enter India’s strategic sectors like ports and information technology networks. There is little information available in the Indian media on China’s information and cyber warfare preparation. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cyber technology experts have hacked more than two hundred South Korean information and communication networks.

Countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh have become captive to China’s investment and control in their infrastructure projects. The construction of the $248 million Gwadar deep-sea port will be controlled by the Chinese.

There is no case for India to acquire Chinese technology. In fact, India is technologically ahead of China in areas like software, satellites, etc. China’s export of technology to South Asia has been, and continues to be, military oriented. Pakistan is a stand-alone nuclear power today entirely because of China. China’s target was India. A similar scenario may now be unfolding in Bangladesh. China has armed Pakistan to the teeth with conventional weapons and is now doing so with Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Most in India tend to miss China’s anti-India psychological warfare. Chinese official propaganda project India as a “big power” with “hegemonist” ambitions posing a threat to countries from the Middle East to South East Asia. Chinese media periodically deplores Indian society and its economy.

Sino-Indian relations began to improve since late Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China. The Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) implemented in the 1990s along the border produced some positive results. China’s request for Indian support for its observer status in NAM and willingness to work together on human rights issues in Geneva was met sincerely.

However, it needs to be noted that China blocked India’s membership to the APEC and the NPT, almost permanently. India became a member of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) despite China’s opposition. China has been non-committal on India’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China has obliquely warned against India’s military presence in Central Asia. It was China alone that pushed the UN Draft Resolution 1172 in 1998, impressing upon India and Pakistan to dismantle their nuclear programmes. China’s caveat was that India must roll back first.

China’s recognition of Indian sovereignty over Sikkim is being interpreted as an exchange for India’s recognition of total Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 2003. There is an effort to project a non-issue like Sikkim as a concession to India. The fact remains that China continues to treat Sikkim as an historical issue between the two countries and it will take time to resolve it. It was also made out that China agreed to open the trade route via Nathu La in Sikkim as a goodwill gesture. But China has been pushing for trade marts in Sikkim and Kalimpong since the early 1990s.

Similarly, a shift in China’s stand on Kashmir was not a sign of goodwill. It was, rather, due to rising separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang Uighur

Autonomous Region that escalated from the late 1980s. There are several UN resolutions on Tibet that worry China at the moment. It would be naive to believe that China’s shift on Kashmir is permanent.