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Journalism of Courage
Forty years on,Indias armed forces still draw from the lessons learnt during the war that led to the liberation of Bangladesh.
The Navys missile strike in Karachi and the sinking of the Ghazni,turning factors in the war,have influenced planners in later years. Indias official Maritime Military Strategy,published in 2007,concedes that there had been a hot debate within on the possible repercussions of the missile attack. The likely international repercussions against Exclusion Zones were also overestimated, the white paper on maritime strategy says.
The Navy also learnt its knowledge of submarines was undeveloped in 1971; Pakistan had an edge there. The current strategy calls for a strong conventional submarine fleet.
The war also showed that the Navys support elements,particulary the tanker fleet,were inadequate. Short strikes were possible,but not longer deputations of the force at sea. The current strategy calls for ships with long sea-legs,duly supported by logistics support ships. This has led to the recent acquisition of two tankers of Italian origin,plus indegenous efforts to boost the support fleet.
The biggest lesson,however,was the need for joint amphibious assaults. An opportunity for conduct of an outflanking amphibious assault was missed in 1971. When undertaken,it was done without adequate preparation and assets,thus limiting the overall effect in the outcome of the conflict, the doctrine says.
Land and Air
The complete air dominance managed over the Eastern Sector was the enabling factor for the Armys quick thrust that led to the surrender in Dhaka. The absence of a hostile Air Force operating over the Army meant that heliborne operations were possible,lifting the 4/5 Gurkha Rifles to capture Sylhet. The Western Sector was more complex given the higher concentration of enemy aircraft,but the tank massacre at Longewala was an example how air power turned the tables in ground battle.
The present composition of the Air Force derives from this very principle of achieving air superiority in the first few days of battle. While the equipment profile has changed,the frontline fighter that will soon form the backbone of the Air Force is the Su 30 MKI,designed to get across the border,fight its way through an aerial battle and bomb enemy positions. The complete numerical superiority that the IAF has achieved over its Pakistani counterpart since 1971 is one reason why the Kargil skirmish did not escalate into an aerial battle.
The importance of intelligence gathering was demonstrated during the war when four MIG-21s dealt the final blow by bombing the governors house in Dhaka,while Gen A K Niazi was holding a meeting with top civilian members of the government. This was triggered by a small Air Force unit in Kolkata picking up signal intelligence on the meeting.
The Air Force faced financial constraints in the 1980s and early 1990,but its recent acquisitions include airborne early warning systems,aerostat radars and signal intelligence equipment.
Deep Thrust
The Army was already battle-hardened after 1962 and 1965,but the main strategy that ensured quick success in 1971 is still in force for most current battle plans bypassing cities and townships for a quick thrust deep into enemy territory.
The battle strategy for the Western sector is now based on the lessons learnt in the East carry enough resources to build bridges,motorable tracts and passages through Punjab and Kutch. It calls for bypassing major towns,which are always difficult to capture and bog down troops,with the help of a logistical support link. While it is debatable whether the policy holds good for modern combat,the equipment profile of the Army is still geared for this strategy bridge-laying equipment,tanks and vehicles geared to float through water bodies,bypassing towns.
While all three forces are now undergoing a massive transformation given emerging global challenges,the 1971 lessons will still stay on a bit longer.
