Weaponisation by default

There are many questions related to our participation in the non-proliferation agenda of the nuclear weapons powers led by the United States, needing indepth consideration by our government. Have we, for example, achieved levels of technological development where we really do not need to conduct any more tests? A specific derivative question: have we achieved sufficient competence in conducting sub-critical tests, in continuing laboratory work for miniaturisation of nuclear weapons? There is adifference of opinion within the Indian scientific community about the advisability of our having declared a moratorium on further tests.

The second question is whether we have carefully assessed the implications of the international inspection systems, stipulated in the CTBT and of the operational stipulations of the “national technical means”. The third question: have we carefully considered the implications of the concept of “permissible activities”? Fourth, is there really a compulsion to sign the CTBT before September 1999, especially in the context of the likelihood of US itself and China and Russia not ratifying it?

To be fair, the Vajpayee government must have considered these questions, but there has been no transparency about its conclusions, nor has there been any substantive discussion on these questions between the government and political parties. A new government will have to remedy this situation. Our decisions on our nuclear doctrines, the terms of reference within which we shallparticipate in the international non-proliferation processes, as set in motion by the major powers, should obviously depend on two factors: first, the missile and nuclear weaponisation policies and programmes of the major powers of the world and, secondly, the evolving security and strategic environment in our neighbourhood.

The nuclear weapons powers still hold that they will continue to maintain their nuclear and missile arsenals at certain levels. They have indicated clearly that they will continue to improve the quality of these weapons with the framework of “permissible activities” under various international regimes of which they are the primary and unilateral initiators.

Parallel to this is the incremental use of space and space technology to maintain superior military power in relation to the majority of countries. A recent assessment on the strategic use of space made in Western Europe says: “For decades into the future the US will have as a priority to protect and expand its position ofmilitary dominance in space. Keeping a monopoly on an expanding space power capability is a cornerstone of US military doctrine… Anti-satellite weapons are a priority in any war with space dimensions, that is to say in any war which the US might fight in future.”

The assessment adds: “There is blurring of lines regarding civilian and military use of space with regard to NASA and the US Space Command. The space shuttle could easily become a space warship. In a sense it has already crossed the line in the past when astronauts have released spy satellites during classified shuttle missions. The shuttle could in the future be sent to pick up another country’s satellite and remove it from space.”

Added to this is the recent decision of the US to construct `war reserve pits’ where nuclear weapons and missiles can be stored to meet international military challenges. Presumably, China, France and Russia will undertake parallel, if not similar, projects.

It is clear that the international community willremain subject to a nuclear and missile-weaponised world. One does not have to go into any detailed analysis of our regional security environment. Both Pakistan and China are equipped with nuclear weapons and missiles. There are other nuclear weapons’ presence in the South China Sea, in the Indian Ocean and around the Gulf. The only way to counter these vulnerabilities is to acquire and sustain credible defence capacities.

Even after nine rounds of talks with the US and frequent contacts with three other nuclear weapons powers as well as countries like Japan, Germany and China, India is still being asked to be responsive to the discriminatory benchmarks stipulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1172 passed after the Shakti tests in 1998. The benchmarks are: India being asked to sign NPT, CTBT and FMCT (when the FMCT is finalised); India being asked to cap and, if possible, roll back its missile programme with the additional requirement that it should quickly come to terms with Pakistan onKashmir.

Basic non-proliferation objectives of the nuclear weapons powers, led by the US, have not undergone any meaningful change, responding to Indian concerns. This is the over-arching political reality which a new government will have to grapple with while not eroding India’s security interests.

The solution does not lie in confrontation or withdrawal symptoms. We should continue the process of engagement. Our aim should be to change the negotiating framework, modify the benchmarks to meet our strategic concerns. We must also convince the nuclear weapons powers and others that, while we have weaponised ourselves due to unavoidable circumstances, we remain keen on bringing about a non-discriminatory non-proliferation order in the world.