Vajpayee belies fears

The concerns of both Wahid and Ecevit about secessionist movements in their countries, backed by cross-border terrorism, were similar to those India has about developments in Kashmir and the Northeast. There is also a convergence of strategic and security interests between India on the one hand and Turkey and Indonesia on the other, relating to Central Asia and the Southeast Asian region.

Pakistani commentators have acknowledged the phenomenon when commenting on Ecevit’s visit they said that “the point relevant here is that Turkey, possibly the only country with which Pakistanis have a people to people bond, India has struck a common chord. We cannot, therefore, harbour any illusions about the extent of Pakistan’s international isolation.” Indonesia and Mal-aysia have been supportive of India’s incremental integration into the Asian Regional Security Forum over the last two years.

India is increasing its contacts with the secretariat of the OIC. The initiatives taken in relations with Iran by our government is of particular significance in the context of our relations with Pakistan and our interests in the Central As-ian Republics. The initial months of the BJP-led government saw Iran ca-refully assessing its foreign policy orientations towards Islamic countries. By the end of 1998, and the beginning of 1999, Iran as well as other Islamic countries realised that the notions about the government being anti-Islamic countries were erroneous.

Jaswant Singh’s visit to Teheran during the second half of May is the culmination of the process of the meaningful revival in Indo-Iranian relations. What are the tangible interests which underpin these relations? Iran needs friends as well as cooperation with friendly countries to break out of the isolation imposed on it by the West. India needs influential friends in the Islamic world to counter Pakistani hostility. India has the interest of obtaining energy resources from Iran and utilising it as a market for Indian exports. Iran would be interested in India’s technological knowhow and Indian cooperation in developing its surface transportation facilities and ports. Given India’s hostile relations with Pakistan and the tension and uncertainties in Afghanistan, Iran is the only conduit through which India can establish closer relations with Central Asian Republics, stretching from Turkmenistan in the west and Kazakhstan in the east.

India and Iran have shared concerns about the Talibanisation of Afghanistan which can generate centrifugal impulses in both. They share worries about the persecution of Shias in Pakistan. Even on Kashmir, Iran’s stand is nuanced and responsive to India’s concern about its unity and territorial integrity.

Iran is also keen to supply natural gas through a direct pipeline linking Iran and India through Pakistani territory, in a project in which India is interested, but about which India has political and strategic doubts as the pipeline passes through Pakistani territory. Recent reports are that Iran has persuaded Pakistan to allow the pipeline to go through with a promised royalty of 700 million to 800 million dollars to Pakistan, provided Pakistan assures safety of supplies to India. The Ambanis are reportedly interested in linking the pipeline with their Gujarat refinery project.

In broader terms, India is aware of Iran’s influential voice in the Organisation of Islamic Countries. It is also an influential voice in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. There are also prospects of defence cooperation between the two in terms of Iranian requirements.

All these prospects of cooperation were part of Jaswant Singh’s discussions with President Khatemi and Foreign Minister Kharazi. Their joint directive to the Indo-Iran Joint Commission was to structure policies and projects to advance Indo-Iranian relationship in a broad spectrum.

Vice-President Krishan Kant’s visit to Cairo in mid-June to participate in the G-15 Summit added another dimension to Indo-Iranian relations. India was actively instrumental in supporting Iran’s admission to G-15. The visit also provided an opportunity for high-level contacts between India and Egypt.

Kant’s discussions with President Hosni Mubarak focussed on reviving bilateral relations. The distance which had developed between India and Egypt during President Anwar Sadat’s time is fading away.

The prospects of India’s relations with the Gulf countries have elements of uncertainty. Though a number of bilateral agreements were signed on economic cooperation projects with countries like Oman and Abu Dhabi since 1992, the delay in finalising operational arrangements to implement them and in the decision-making processes here have resulted in these countries pulling back from some of the projects. In the slightly longer term, increase of trained indigenous manpower in these countries will result in reduced employment opportunities for Indians in them. They are in the process of introducing progressive restrictions on immigration for long-term stay of foreigners.

This will affect the skilled and semi-skilled work force of Indians who have been staying in these for nearly three decades.

The three-pronged policy being followed by the government towards Islamic countries is practical: first, to expand political contacts with them; secondly, to increase contacts with the OIC Secretariat; and, thirdly, to expand economic and technological cooperation with them. Consolidating these relations should remain an important focus of our foreign policy.