Pakistan’s declaration that its security forces would exercise restraint along the Line of Control has predictably posed questions about its intent. This suddenly expressed desire for quietude could well be meant to signal Islamabad's ever-so-slight endorsement for the process initiated with New Delhi's unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it could just as easily be an attempt to score brownie points while surreptitiously scuttling progress towards a political resolution of the Kashmir tangle. All that is known with any certainty is that Pakistan's foreign secretary has a fascinating way with words - he expressed the hope that India would reciprocate his government's initiative and ``cease firing across the LoC''. In any event, it is to be hoped that the volatile de facto border in Jammu and Kashmir will witness a respite from the sporadic firing that provides residents with a totally unwelcome light and sound show, that serves as a cover for militants zipping between the twocountries, and that always threatens to escalate into a wider conflict.It may be premature to hail Pakistan's overture, but the question is, why is its military establishment adopting a conciliatory posture after actually waving away the Ramzan cessation of hostilities as a gimmick which does not factor in a tripartite dialogue? The urge to mop up international support is always there, but for Islamabad a new variant seems to have provoked reappraisal. More than their counterparts in New Delhi being cast as peacemakers, the powers that be in Islamabad are bound to be worried about Kashmir being perceived - both within the Valley as well as beyond the subcontinent - as an Indian problem. This fear would have been heightened on two counts. First, they would be worried about the overtly enthusiastic response by some Kashmiri separatist leaders to the ceasefire, especially those affiliated to the Hurriyat, and now the somewhat muted interest shown by the Kashmir wing of the Hizbul Mujahideen. Certainly, none of these leaders have dropped the demand that Pakistan be involved ina meaningful dialogue, but the evolving consensus among them that could lend a semblance of tripartite-ness to the proceedings by negotiating with New Delhi first and later with Islamabad could take discussions out of Pakistan's control. Second, there is said to be concern in Islamabad about Hurriyat leaders adding Kashmiri unification to their "Kashmir for Kashmiris" strategy.In all of this, it is easy to view the peace process as a multidimensional game of chess, as a series of gambits and master-moves. That would be inadvisable, for it would only serve to desensitise the gathering at the negotiation table. At stake is finally reclaiming for the people of Jammu and Kashmir a chance to lead a life free of violence and terror. Hence, notwithstanding the caution Pakistan's little gesture merits, the Indian government would be well advised to go the extra mile if the reward at the end could be a respite from cross-border terrorism. Because, without that, not only would New Delhi's hopes of maintaining the calm be dashed, Islamabad's opportunity to prove its sincerity would also be frittered away.
