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Journalism of Courage
The proliferation mess that Pakistan finds itself in has re-emphasised the urgency of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Non-proliferation regimes were tightened substantively in the nineties after Iraq8217;s invasion of Kuwait and the discovery of its clandestine programme. But it is clear that they have been inadequate as much as the Non Proliferation Treaty has been irrelevant in addressing the problem. The inability or unwillingness of Washington to punish Pakistan at this stage only adds to the difficulties of dealing with the future spread of nuclear weapons technology, particularly to non-state actors, which presents unprecedented challenges since traditional deterrence is unlikely to work. George Bush8217;s seven-point plan to control nuclear proliferation in future, although spelt out only in terms of broad principles, is timely. Much of its future would depend upon the fine print and how the broad picture is translated into action.
We in this country need to examine these ideas objectively, detached from the Pakistan factor and/or ideological baggage, and try to shape the debate and an outcome that protects our core interests. Bush8217;s call for a UN Security Council resolution requiring all states to treat proliferation as a criminal activity appears useful, but would depend greatly on how proliferation is defined and what steps are taken in case of violations. Similarly, much would depend on how the proposal to ban new countries from having the ability to enrich or process nuclear materials evolves. This concept seems to have evolved from the earlier idea of stopping future production of nuclear materials for making weapons 8212; a proposal sponsored jointly by the US and India and adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in December 1993. Unfortunately, negotiations on this treaty have been moribund because of US-China disagreements.
