Over the past few days, there has been a flurry of activities marked by cassettes, commands and communications from Veerappan to the Karnataka Government, from Karnataka to Tamil Nadu and from H Nagappa’s family to both governments. Some weeks ago, there was a bandh in Karnataka to get the Janata Dal (United) leader released from Veerappan’s two-and-a-half-month-old captivity. But there is no trace of either Veerappan or Nagappa. We heard only Karnataka Chief Minister S M Krishna’s profound words of wisdom: ‘‘There was no national highway to drive in and capture Veerappan as and when we wished’’. While Special Task Force (STF) operations have been suspended for mysterious reasons, Nagappa’s family has been running from pillar to post with mercy petitions seeking his rescue. Soon after Nagappa’s kidnap, the Joint STF of the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka intensified operations to catch Veerappan. At least 1,500 personnel were deployed, reportedly deployed at strategic locations with a large ‘‘crack team’’ for combing operations. A 140-member team of National Security Guard (NSG) commandos, headed by a senior officer of the rank of brigadier and equipped with latest hi-tech weapons and gadgets, also flew in from New Delhi and joined forces with the STF. But even such a massive force armed to the teeth could not get anywhere near Veerappan because of the total failure of police intelligence and lack of a cohesive strategy by both Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. For several years now, the Governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have been conducting ‘Operation Catch Veerappan’ more as a farce than as a serious, professional exercise. The STF only added to the sham, with Chennai’s police commissioner doubling up as a part-time commander of this force which was operating in the jungles hundreds of miles away! And Karnataka went one step further, making the DGP himself the head the STF. This has only encouraged the police, politicians and the press to spread the myth of the invincibility of Veerappan and the impregnability of the ‘‘thick and dense jungle”. Commandos are the ultimate force to strike against terror and crime, and the issue of deploying commando forces to capture or kill Veerappan needs an informed debate. There is enough and more justification in deploying crack commandos to nab the sandalwood smuggler. But the term ‘‘commando’’ is being used in a loose and uninformed manner. The real commandos who can be effective in the jungles are in the Army, not with the NSG or the Border Security Force (BSF). The genesis of the commando force in the Army lies in the late ’60s, when infantry troops were combating underground rebels in the North-eastern states of Nagaland and Manipur. These states were almost fully covered by mountainous jungles, which were much larger and more dense and dangerous than the forests that Veerappan now dominates. The underground ‘‘Naga Army’ was much bigger and much more highly trained and equipped than Veerappan’s ‘bandit brigade’. Since the proficiency level of the infantry in jungle warfare was limited at that time, the soldiers faced initial difficulties, and some fine men and officers lost their lives. Realising this, the Army Headquarters introduced commando and jungle warfare training as a major activity at the Infantry School in Mhow in Madhya radesh. The results were dramatic: young officers returning from this training took charge of platoons, trained the men and led them into action, the hostiles were truly on the run. This resulted in the virtual decimation of the recalcitrant Naga underground and paved the way for the return of peace and normalcy in that troubled state. The commando school is now a full-fledged institution of the Indian Army. Well-trained Army commandos operating in the jungle merge with the terrain in which they operate and survive with whatever they get from there. They operate on the 4S principle—secrecy, stealth, speed and stamina—to accomplish their task. We have the best of these men in the infantry. The state police force and STF are neither fit nor trained for this task. Even NSG and BSF commandos are not equipped to carry out jungle operations. The NSG’s expertise is in storming aircrafts and buildings, while BSF operations are confined to desert terrain. It is in this context that one should consider a recent statement by a senior Army commander that ‘‘the police is capable of nabbing the bandit and it will not fall back on us. There is no role for the army and it is time the state police started learning to do its own job’’. The General seems to have got it wrong on both counts: ‘‘capability of the police to do the job’’ and ‘‘no role for the army’’. The less said about the ‘‘competence’’ of the police, the better. When the police fail, Army assistance should be sought and promptly given. This is the cardinal principle of the Army’s role in ‘‘aid to civilian power’’. And Operation Catch Veerappan, which has become a shameful comment on India’s governance, is an eminent case for ‘Army’s aid to civil power’ and brooks no more delay.The writer is a former officer of the Indian Army and IAS. He led Infantry troops in operations against the Naga underground army
