Time to end isolation

The PM8217;s special envoys, Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh, who have over the past 10 days been scouring the world 8212; except China 8212; are also passing on that message. Tragically, however, the Government8217;s amazing ability to tie itself up in knots on such an important issue has given teeth tothe Opposition, thereby preventing a political consensus.

On the evening of May 11, Principal Secretary Mishra told the international media that 8220;India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the CTBT. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.

8221; Hot air? Or just famously empty last words? What are 8220;some of the undertakings8221; the Government seeks from the international community? Repeated questioning of Government spokesmen, including Mishra, has elicited only the response that New Delhi will tell all to its 8220;key interlocutors8221;, presumably the Permanent Five nuclear states. The people of India stand excluded.

New Delhi8217;s message, give or take its much talked-about diplomatic offensive, must now be crisp and clear: It should quickly sign the CTBT, not only to show its readiness to engage internationally, but also because India8217;sfive nuclear tests have given its scientists enough data to be able to conduct simulations in the laboratory.

It is this new found competence which provides the guarantee of safeguarding the nation8217;s security. In fact, as Vajpayee and others have pointed out, it was a 8220;deterioration in the security environment8221; which persuaded India to go nuclear. Apart from attempting to level the balance of power vis-a-vis China, New Delhi may have to face coercive measures by the Conference on Disarmament when it meets in September 1999, three years after the treaty was signed in 1996.

A cursory reading of policy since Indira Gandhi ordered the first test in 1974 shows that 8220;security concerns8221; have been the bottom line.

In 1968, when India refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT and the US threatened to hold back PL-480 grain from reaching India, Indira Gandhi told Parliament that 8220;we shall be guided entirely by our self-enlightenment and the considerations of our national security8221;.

In1996, when the United Front government opposed India8217;s signature to the CTBT 8212; and attempted to block it internationally 8212; India8217;s representative at the UN, Arundhati Ghosh, pointed out that 8220;our national security considerations become a key factor in our decision making8230; India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form8221;.

A paper on the Evolution of India8217;s Nuclear Policy8217; laid on the table of the House by Vajpayee on May 27, goes on to explain the 1996 refusal: 8220;Our perception then was that subscribing to the CTBT would severely limit India8217;s nuclear potential at an unacceptably low level.8221; Gujral also linked the refusal to the world8217;s inability to carry forward a truly comprehensive disarmament process.

The changed circumstances, after May 13, look after India8217;s first concern. The data generated from the five tests now gives India reasonably respectable nuclear potential. As far as the disarmament argument is concerned, India as a proven nuclear member of the CTBT club, will havemuch more standing to work on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Clearly, for the same reasons, India cannot sign the NPT: it does not address New Delhi8217;s security concerns and does not let it join as a nuclear weapons power. The articles of the NPT will have to be amended before that happens. Further, as Government sources point out, the CTBT is not a 8220;discriminatory8221;agreement. It prohibits all countries, including nuclear weapons states from carrying out underground tests, but does not prevent anyone from testing in the lab.

So what is the meaning of public statements put out by the Government8217;s most articulate spokesmen, that India 8220;will not sign the CTBT8221;? In two words, not much. Governments of India, past and present, have grown accustomed to sounding off from the high moral ground about pursuing the 8220;complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework8221;. This Government also feels that it will do 8220;nothing under pressure8221;, that the time is not right yet to sign on thedotted line.

India has already announced a voluntary moratorium on tests, thereby fulfilling the main condition of the CTBT. It should now move towards legalising its offer of de jure acceptance of status 8212; hopefully, in the run-up to explaining the real meaning of the CTBT to the Opposition.

India has shown that it can take on the world. But here8217;s a chance of ending its isolation 8212; on its own terms.

What is the CTBT?