The fall of Elephant Pass, which connects Jaffna peninsula with the mainland in Sri Lanka rings the alarm bell for Sri Lanka and its beleaguered army. And, as much for India and more importantly, for Tamil Nadu. The shocking abandonment of the Elephant Pass by the Sri Lankan army on April 22 has exposed the 35,000-strong Sri Lankan army to two clear dangers - one, encirclement by the LTTE in the Jaffna peninsula and two, loss of supply access. It all started prior to the Sri Lankan Presidential election in December 1999. The Sri Lankan army had defended the 36 km-stretch between Mankulam (near Vavuniya) and Omandai for 18 months. But the LTTE overran the stretch in just four days. Even at that time the LTTE had declared that its target was Elephant Pass. After the Presidential election, sometime in January this year, the LTTE captured Vetrilaikeni which connected a corridor to Elephant Pass from the east coast. This was a strategic move as this corridor was the only supply route from the seaside to Elephant Pass. The Lankan army had vowed to capture this access back, but could not. The A9 national highway, the main artery, runs across right from the main land in Sri Lanka, from south to north. This highway connects the Jaffna peninsula and all towns in it with the mainland through the Elephant Pass. After the LTTE had captured the seaside corridor, this was unquestionably the next target of LTTE. The LTTE attacked the A9 national highway from Thalaiadi, located 4 km north of Vetrilaikeni - and reached within 4 km of the highway. Now, the LTTE was well positioned to push ahead. Predictably, on April 22 they overran Takkachi where Sri Lankan artillery had been located. They accomplished it in 48 hours. From here, Elephant Pass was just 2.5 km away. The LTTE warned the Sri Lankan army and asked them to leave Elephant Pass in two hours. And to the surprise of even the LTTE the Sri Lankan army obliged - and withdrew from Elephant Pass! This was a stunning retreat. For a stretch of 15 km through the Elephant Pass there is not a single human habitation, an ideal setting for the Sri Lankan Air Force to provide air support to the army at Elephant Pass - and to keep the LTTE at bay. Yet nothing like that happened. The fall of Elephant Pass confirms one thing beyond all doubt - that the Sri Lankan army is not motivated enough to face up to the LTTE. It looks neither professional nor conscript. The singular difference between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army is not in the types of arms they have, but, in the motivation levels. In contrast, the IPKF, which fought LTTE with one hand tied back, virtually finished the fire power of LTTE. When the LTTE menace was getting bottled-up, Sri Lanka ungratefully showed the door to the IPKF, which went at their invitation. Sri Lanka has not recovered from this folly. It looks it never will. Now the Sri Lankan army seems virtually clueless. The LTTE is within the striking distance of Thenmaratchi and Vadamaratchi which are highly populated. If the LTTE attacks these places, the inhabitants in the towns will have no place to go other than take their boats and land in Rameswaram and Dhanushkoti. The Jaffna peninsula has a population of 4,75,000. In case of a fierce war, which the present combat seems to promise, most of the peninsular population will have to leave Jaffna - and their destination could only be India, Tamil Nadu. Nearly 35,000 Sri Lankan soldiers are in Jaffna peninsula. The Pallaly air base is in Jaffna north-sea coast. If the LTTE reach Point Pedro from which Pellaly is within the striking distance of the LTTE artillery, they will immobilise the Sri Lankan air force through artillery fire, thus threatening to encircle the army denied of air support. This seems as inevitable as the large scale influx of refugees into Tamil Nadu, unless the Sri Lankan government secures respite through a ceasefire or gets a third party intervention like the UN peace-keeping force, or it has something else up its sleeve. A ceasefire seems unlikely as the LTTE with successive victories could hardly bite the ceasefire call. A third party, whether it is India or UN, is unlikely to intervene. The way Sri Lankan government treated the IPKF has ruled out once and for all any direct Indian involvement. This is despite the fact that the Buddhist establishment which threatened self-immolation if IPKF continued its presence in Sri Lanka, is now desperately looking for India's direct assistance to resist the LTTE. The only viable, long-term alternative for Sri Lanka seems to be to confederate with India like the European countries have done. In which case the LTTE's moral basis for separation will vanish and it will have to fall in line, or fight with India. The Hindu-Buddhist civilisations are basically non-conflicting. In some temples in Sri Lanka, there are Buddha idols and in some Buddha viharas there are Hindu idols. A confederate India-Sri Lanka would only restore the historic ethnic-religious unity between India and Sri Lanka. But this would call for great vision and statesmanship, national consensus and political conviction. It is a long-term alternative, but, this can offer clarity for short term solutions. For the present, however, the refugee menace with all accompaniments like LTTE infiltration, seems to be staring at an anxious India and a scared Tamil Nadu. Whatever the final outcome, India presently is in a Catch-22 situation.
