
The issue of India being entrapped into a bilateral commitment in an agreement with the US on nuclear cooperation not to carry out nuclear tests has proved to be a flash in the pan. The deal is very complex and the exercise of exceptionalising India from a treaty 8212; which the entire international community excepting three out of the 191 nations, in its wisdom extended unconditionally and indefinitely 8212; has no precedent. Such negotiations would need more than normal diplomatic confidentiality. It is therefore no surprise that the issue of India8217;s commitment not to carry out tests, featuring in the American draft of the Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, had been addressed by the ministry of external affairs two weeks before the preliminary draft no longer current became public. However, this is an appropriate time to discuss the probability of the current, somewhat tenuous test ban regime breaking down and India being compelled to resort to testing again.
Out of the five recognised nuclear weapon powers, three 8212; UK, France and Russia 8212; have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US Senate has rejected the ratification of the treaty while China, presumably keeping a watch on the US, has not yet ratified it. If either resumes testing, then others are bound to follow. This possibility will be weighing with the US and China even though they have not ratified the treaty. Every once in a while reports emanate from the US about Congress voting funds for further research on nuclear weapons. A bunker-busting bomb is frequently mentioned as a near-term possibility. But resumption of tests would need congressional approval. It is therefore very unlikely that the world will be taken by surprise by an American test. There will be some notice and other nations will have time to react. One cannot, however, assume that in spite of these considerations the US would not dump the CTBT into the dustbin and go ahead and test. It may be recalled that the US annulled the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after 30 years, though the annulment was preceded by negotiations with Russia and was done with its reluctant acquiescence.
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote in the Washington Post in December: 8220;For the first time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable. Major states are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war. To advance this remarkable trend, the US is transforming our partnerships with nations such as Japan and Russia, with the European Union and especially with China and India. Together we are building a more lasting and durable form of global stability, a balance of power that favours freedom.8221;
Unlike the National Missile Defence, which could be justified as a defensive system, new tests in nuclear weapons cannot be advanced as a non-offensive effort to the other major powers. The anti-missile system of the US has led to Russia producing a manoeuvrable warhead missile system, which is unstoppable. This development has a valuable lesson for the US in resuming nuclear tests. Though in the next few years the US will be incurring half of the world8217;s military expenditure, the spending is mostly focused on making the US armed forces unbeatable by any other major power or combination of major powers. As of now, there are no signs of an arms race between the US and China or Russia. Therefore, a reasonable assessment can only be that resumption of nuclear testing is of extremely low probability.
The large-scale global revival of the nuclear industry is going to engage the US weapons laboratories on designing next generation reactors and in keeping the US ahead of other nations in civil nuclear energy research. Till now the weapon laboratories constituted very powerful lobbies against the nuclear test ban. This situation is likely to change. The issue of retaining the freedom to test features largely in the minds of those who are still conditioned by Cold War logic. In March President Bush explained the new US policy towards India with the words, 8220;things change, times change8221;.
India8217;s own attitude towards nuclear testing would illustrate the above axiom. Jawaharlal Nehru proposed a complete test ban treaty as far back as 1954. India was the first non-nuclear country to enthusiastically sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Because of this stand, India termed the Pokhran test of 1974 a peaceful nuclear explosion. Indira Gandhi attempted to test in 1983, even as she espoused the 8216;six nations, five continents initiative8217;, which urged comprehensive test ban. Rajiv Gandhi followed up this initiative and held a conference of six nations in Delhi in 1986. Comprehensive test ban figured in his disarmament plan. In 1990 the bulk of non-aligned nations used the relevant clause of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to convene a conference to urge comprehensive test ban. This was vetoed by the nuclear weapons powers. In 1994 the CTBT found a mention in the joint statement of Narasimha Rao and Bill Clinton. Even as India had been urging a comprehensive test ban Rao attempted to carry out a nuclear test in December 1995 and was thwarted by the Americans. All through this period successive PMs denied any intention to acquire nuclear weapons.
For the first time in June 1996, while Inder Gujral was foreign minister, India declared in the Conference on Disarmament that nuclear testing was a matter of national security concern for the country. When the CTBT was to be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament India blocked it and compelled it to be taken to the UN General Assembly. There it was passed with near unanimity, with India opposing it.
This narrative is presented here to point out that India could adopt a publicly declared policy from 1954 to 1996 and when compelled by national security considerations could make a complete U-turn.
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