This column has been at the forefront in critiquing the lack of coherent domestic framework of macroeconomic policies for a profitable agriculture and the consequences in declining growth rates and falling investments. It can take quiet satisfaction in this being official since the mid-term appraisal of the plan. Also, it has shown the roots of the crisis lie in the globalisation of agriculture without adequate preparation in the early ’90s. But to argue that our present problems are on account of the stance we are taking at the WTO negotiations is both incorrect and ill informed.Since the superb performance of Murasoli Maran, our commerce minister, at Doha, the strain of which may have cost him his life, and of subsequent successors, India has taken a well crafted strategic approach to trade negotiations. It has been in favour of trade reform rather than against it, protected its own interest and that of the developing countries and has earned the demonstrable respect of opponents and friends. It is high time this is recognised at home and the credit given to the back room boys and the minister who leads them.What is the story in the main? Until recently and even now, the central issue since Doha is agriculture, the so-called Singapore issues being placed on the backburner. India fought tenaciously for Paragraph 13 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration which agreed that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the Schedules of concessions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated, so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their development needs, including food security and rural development. This para took note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by members and confirmed that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture. It, then, led to the fact that the Special Committee on Agriculture had a bifocal strategy of reducing trade distortions and protecting development interests. And so, agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers — subsidies for concessional loans through established credit institutions or for the establishment of regional and community credit cooperatives, transportation subsidies for agricultural products and farm inputs to remote areas, on-farm employment subsidies for families of low-income and resource-poor producers, government assistance for conservation measures and capacity building measures with the objective of enhancing the competitiveness and marketing of low-income and resource-poor producers — were not required to be included in a member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS. This was placed on the agenda going into Cancun, but as is well known, the EU/US draft led to the fiasco there.It is obvious that by the time of the Cancun meetings, countries like India were better prepared and on agriculture, developing countries like Brazil, India, South Africa and China formed an effective coalition that submitted a counter proposal in Geneva to the EU-US proposal. The coalition kept growing and became the the Group of 20 at the start of the Ministerial and 23 by the end. It is now the G-33 which met at Delhi in March this year and where we play a leading role.The collapse at Cancun was inevitable, but it is interesting that in the subsequent discussions Indian pressure meant that the issues raised were back on the table. This meant global recognition. The London meeting in May, 2004 organised by the US and later the G-5, US, EU, India, South Africa and Brazil and later developments, the Five Interested Parties, this time with Australia included, show this. The issue raised emerging from India’s experience keeps recurring as we move forward. A recent review at the global level by John English and Andy Cooper on Leading from the Top at the global level recognises the point I have been making — that the problem is not that Cancun happened, but that it did and the world did not know that it would. The G-33 has become a force. India has successfully placed the global trade negotiations in the context of economic reform and broad based rural growth in poor countries and has developed concepts and instruments accordingly. Its membership of the G-33 gives it validity and its membership of the Five Interested Parties, power. This is a model with great potential. It is silly to rubbish it as some have recently done.
