The weapon of autonomy

All subsequent J&K constitutional orders and changes in the state constitutionafter its adoption in November 1956 are to be rescinded. It is further recommended that Article 370 be permanently entrenched as a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. What will this entail? J&K’s accession to and integration with India would remain inviolate. These are governed by Article 1 and the First Schedule of the Constitution.

Matters in the Union List unaccounted with defence, external affairs and communications (the original heads of accession) will be excluded from the ambit of the Centre while residuary powers will revert back to the state even as the State and Concurrent Lists will not apply to it.

The powers of the Central Election Commission will be limited to the conduct of parliamentary and presidential and vice-presidential elections, with responsibility for state elections being repatriated to the state election commission as prior to 1959.

Barring Article 352, other emergency provisions, especially Article 356, will stand abrogated. However, a proclamation under Article 352 inrelations to “war, external aggression or armed rebellion” will require ratification by the state legislature within two months.

The Delhi agreement had provided for application of fundamental rights to the state with modifications and exceptions such as giving land to the tiller without compensation. Now proposed is inclusion of a fundamental rights chapter in the J&K constitution.

The role of the Supreme Court will be limited to its original jurisdiction (Article 131) pertaining to Centre-state and inter-state disputes, and its appellate jurisdiction to issues certified by the J&K High Court as being substantial questions of law requiring constitutional interpretation. The committee would limit the Comptroller and Auditor-General to scrutiny of Central funding, to the exclusion of state finances and exclude the state from the ambit of all-India services (Article 312).

Despite J&K being declared a special category state (entitled to 90 per cent grant and 10 per cent loan in respect of all Centrallydevolved funds) the committee opines that financial viability dictates “more financial resources and assistance”. Further discussion with the Centre is suggested.

Finally, the nomenclatures Sadr-i-Riyasat (Governor) and Prime Minister (for Chief Minister) are sought to be restored. Under the Delhi agreement, though the Sadr-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the state legislature, he was to be a person acceptable to the Centre and appointed by the President.

The committee’s report offers a basis for discussion both within and outside the state. J&K opinion might itself possibly favour larger Central association provided whatever is agreed to is unamendable except with the consent of the J&K legislature.

More germane is the indeterminate report of the J&K Regional Autonomy Committee which splintered with the ouster of Balraj Puri, its vice-chairman. J&K is a conglomerate multi-ethnic entity with a composite regional and sub-regional personality. Inter se strains and tensions, whether traditional oremerging, need harmonisation. Autonomy for the state is therefore likely to be more widely acceptable given internal devolution.

Rather than specify the form and degree of regional autonomy, the committee poses two options. First, the formation of eight regional/provincial councils, three each in Kashmir and Jammu and two in Ladakh. Alternatively, the establishment of a larger number of district councils.

In either case, these would be elective bodies with delegated powers based on the experience of existing (autonomous) district councils (as in the Northeast) and panchayati raj. The present panchayati raj institutions in the state need greater empowerment if they are to be meaningful, a point that Balraj Puri’s `report’ stresses. Cultural and linguistic safeguards are also proposed. The absence of any reference to the Pandits is a lacuna.

The RAC recommends that the state government set up an expert committee to examine the alternatives. The debate should now move forward and all elements be encouragedto participate. The gun has yielded a bitter harvest. Insurgency has not worked. Yet, the gun was picked up after what Kashmiris see as a betrayal of the 1971 compact. An autonomy package that refurbishes trust offers a viable option around which to build a broad consensus.

The rhetoric of the military-bureaucratic-fundamentalist demagogues has ravaged Pakistan. Ordinary Pakistanis wa nt none of this and, after the abortive gambit in Kargil, need an exit. India must help such saner elements in the interests of stability and harmony in the sub-continent.

Movements towards greater state and regional autonomy on the Indian side, will not leave `Azad’ Kashmir and the Northern Areas untouched. Confronted with a receding constituency in J&K and abroad, Islamabad will be compelled to address the rising discontent on its own side of the LoC by granting those regions the self-determination that it has consistently denied them. The latest Pakistan Supreme Court ruling on the denial of fundamental rights in theNorthern Areas is noteworthy.

Such a denouement would provide opportunity for opening up the two parts of J&K to one another across the LoC which could evolve into a soft international border without derogating from existing de facto Indian and Pakistan sovereignties. Over-arching pan-J&K institutions could also be developed to manage common concerns. Demilitarisation of the LoC and a mutual and balanced reduction of forces could pave the way in time for declaring all of J&K a zone of peace, jointly defended by India and Pakistan. All within the wider framework of a vibrant SAARC.